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Introduction
This thesis will examine the United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement in the context of
American foreign and trade policy in the aftermath of the Cold War. This agreement, ratified in
2001, was the first bilateral free trade agreement signed by the United States which includes
labor and environmental provisions in the main text of the Agreement. The thesis will examine
the role of the Agreement in the context of the 1994 peace treaty between Jordan and Israel and
the broader context of the Clinton Administration’s attempts to create a post-Cold War foreign
policy doctrine to replace Containment. It will further examine the Agreement’s place as the
United States began to more intensely focus on bilateral and regional trade agreements,
including the domestic political debate over NAFTA and the Clinton campaign’s (and later,
Administration’s) decision to support that agreement and negotiate a FTA with Jordan. It will
then examine the effects of the Agreement in the decade and a half following its ratification,
focusing in particular on the surprising explosion of the Jordanian textile industry using a largely
imported labor force.
At the end of World War II, the United States found itself in a position of being the world’s
dominant economic and political superpower in a world where the Great Depression and war
had left a vacuum of global institutions and trade regimes. The country sought to create new
institutions, socially and politically, that would secure its global position while also creating the
stability necessary to prevent a second global depression or third world war. To these ends,
trade policy served two heavily interlinked purposes: First, to support American industry and

employment, and consequently, to strengthen international relationships, using commerce to
strengthen connections, reward close allies, and isolate others.
American trade policy from the end 1945 to 2016 can be roughly divided into two phases, both
of which eventually enjoyed a large degree of bipartisan support. In the first era, from 1945 until
the 1984, the country sought to create global (though frequently excluding Communist-bloc
nations) agreements to standardize trade regimes and lower tariffs through the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations. As the GATT process slowed, the United
States negotiated free trade agreements with individual nations or small regional blocs,
beginning with the Israel-United States Free Trade Agreement in 1984, beginning the second
phase of post-war trade policy.
This phase became broadly bipartisan when then-candidate Bill Clinton voiced official support for
the newly-negotiated North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) during his 1992 campaign.
During the next quarter century, these free trade agreements were supported by a large
bipartisan coalition in Congress, and had the support of every major presidential nominee.
Negotiations frequently began under an administration from one party to be later ratified later
under a president from another party. Limiting agreements to specific nations allowed them to
become a more focused foreign policy tool, allowing the US to “reward” specific nations, as was
the case with Israel, a key US ally, or Asia-Pacific nations which served as a bulwark against
Chinese expansion, as in the case of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Over 32 years,
negotiations continued, largely unabated, through five presidential administrations and three
party transitions in the White House.
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This phase ended in 2016 when both major presidential candidates voiced opposition to the TPP,
which promised to be the largest trade agreement ratified by the United State in decades. The
election of Donald Trump makes it unlikely that the TPP will ever be revived, and as such, marks
the end of an era in American trade policy of continuous bipartisan trade negotiation. The
criticisms leveled against the TPP by then-candidate Trump, as well as Sen. Sanders, and later
Secretary Clinton, that the agreement “sold out” American workers and corporations to lowercost countries, with few to no protections for workers (though additional criticisms included that
they do not protect high-value American intellectual property or include environmental
protections), were neither new nor novel, and, in fact, had been a core part of the 1992
presidential campaign until Clinton effectively ended the debate by endorsing free trade and
winning the Democratic nomination. In fact, the US-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (USJFTA), the
only free agreement negotiated primarily under the Clinton Administration, sought to address
concerns with these agreements head on by including labor, intellectual property, and
environmental protections in the main body of the agreement.
Understanding why these criticisms resonated with so many voters across such a broad swatch
of the political spectrum in the 2016 presidential campaign entails understanding why the
USJFTA failed to adequately address and serve as a counterpoint to these criticisms. Explaining
the agreement, its specific language and protections, necessitates understanding the context of
the agreement and the forces that helped shaped it. It will also place the Agreement into the
broader shifts of foreign policy that occurred as the Clinton Administration sought to create a
new paradigm for foreign policy after the Cold War. The chapter will then conclude by
evaluating the Agreement’s success as an instrument of foreign policy.
3

The second chapter will examine the USJFTA in the context of American trade policy in the
postwar period. The chapter will first more closely evaluate the shift in policy towards bilateral
(and regional) free trade agreements, and pay particular attention to the political considerations
that lead to Clinton’s support for NAFTA in the 1992 Presidential election. It will then examine
the beliefs, challenges and successes of the Clinton Administration in trade policy. It will argue
the Agreement was created to serve as the paradigmatic example of “Enlargement,” the
Administration’s argument that closely coupling trade and foreign policy could simultaneously
preserve and expand American hegemony, expand democracy, and economic welfare abroad
and at home, and evaluate it against this standard.
The third chapter will focus on the direct economic effects of the agreement. It will look at
macroeconomic indicators, primarily in Jordan (it will be shown that the effects on the American
economy have been predictably negligible), before and after the Agreement’s ratification. The
chapter will then examine the Agreement’s effects on specific sectors of the Jordanian economy,
including the profound and unexpected importation of a multinational workforce in Jordan, and
evaluate the Agreement’s affects against multiple economic theories on free trade.
The thesis will conclude by examining the rhetoric around free trade in the 2016 US Presidential
election and compare these criticisms to the Agreement’s aims and effects in terms of
international relations (as discussed in the first chapter), trade policy (as discussed in the second)
and economics (as discussed in the third).
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Literature Review
This thesis will argue that the USJFTA should be evaluated as a tool of foreign policy, an example
of trade policy, with a particular emphasis on the economic effects of the trade agreement. As
such, the thesis draws upon international relations theory, trade theory and economics. The
following section will examine the competing perspectives of Neo-Realists, Neo-Liberals, and
Dependency Theorists as it relates to trade policy, with some notes on contributions from
Marxian thought on the topic. Following this evaluation, the literature review will examine
economic perspectives on free trade, and bilateral FTAs specifically.

Liberalism and Neo-Liberalism
There are three main branches of Liberal theory, as identified by Keohane (1986), all of which
are relevant in understanding the USJFTA. Each of these three branches can trace their origins
to Emmanual Kant’s Perpetual Peace (1795), and all essentially argue that peace between states
occur because of various kinds of linkage between states (and their populations), and not
because of balance of power arrangements between states. (The links were formally tied to Kant
in the literature by Russet et al, 1998.) The first branch of Liberal theory that will be discussed is
commercial Liberalism, which states that wars are less likely between states that have developed
strong trade links. The second is democratic Liberalism, which emphasizes that republican
governments are less likely to start wars, and the third is institutional Liberalism, which stresses
the importance of rules, regulatory frameworks and institutions in establishing predictable
relationships between countries.
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Although the specifics may differ, a wide array of Liberal thinkers argues that there is a positive
link between the expansion of trade and peace (Polachek, 1980; Morrow, 1999; Stein 2003;
Levy, 2002; Gartzke, Li and Boehmer, 2001; Haas, 1958; Deutsch, 1978). One of the earlier
modern authors to advance the notion that increased interdependence from trade would reduce
the chances for conflict was Angell in his work The Great Illusion (1912). The publication of this
work shortly before the outbreak of World War I undermined the theories he advanced –deadly
wars following a period of increased trade did not fit his theory.
Similarly, a key component of Neoliberalism as advanced by Keohane and Nye (1989) (which is
part of commercial liberalism) is the notion that although states are one actor in international
relations, they are not the only actor (as often described by Neorealists, below) when it comes to
economic policy, and that security interests are not the sole reason that states act. Instead,
nations are linked in many ways: directly between governments, through government-sponsored
activities such as cultural exchanges, and from non-governmental entities such as transnational
corporations, and even personal connections across borders. As a result, it is not always possible
to cleanly separate domestic interests and foreign policy.
In the “trade” branch of liberalism sits modern authors such as Richard Rosecrane, whose The
Rise of the Trading State (1986) argues that nations which focus on territorial questions of
sovereignty (the United States and USSR are given as two examples) do so to their detriment.
Rosecrane posits in The Rise of the Trading State that focusing on improving mutually beneficial
trade relationships is a better way of achieving prosperity than attempting to use force for
accumulation of power or resources. Weede (2004) argues that trade links have a greater ability
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to reduce the likelihood of war between states than democracy or other commonly posited
liberal factors. Similarly, Polachek (1980) uses an expected utility model to argue that trade
(more or less) unconditionally promotes peace, as “the cost of being belligerent… increases with
the level of trade.” After a given amount of trade, nations simply cannot afford the trade costs of
a conflict – so will find ways to keep trading.
The second branch is democratic Liberalism, closely related to democratic peace theory, which
posits, broadly, that democracies are less likely to go to war, either in general (monadic peace)
or against other democracies (dyadic peace). Most theorists tend to focus on dyadic peace.
Muller and Wolff (2004) attempted to determine the direction of causality between democracy
and peace. They found that democracies may be less likely to go to war than other, nondemocratic states, but that the theory and evidence advanced for monadic peace is “neither
necessary nor convincing,” finding more the evidence for dyadic peace to be more compelling.
Democratic peace theorists differ on the reasons why democracies are less likely to go to war.
Russet (1993) argues that separation of power prevalent in most democracies prohibits a single
leader from going to war. Thus, a decision to go to war must necessarily be deliberate, and
slower than a unilateral decision (Russet, 1993; Reiter and Stam, 2002). In explaining why
democracies are more willing to go to war against non-democracies, it is because democracies
are more likely to mobilize against democracies because both branches realize that quick
mobilization may be necessary to protect security interests (Reiter and Stam, 2002). In
democracies, leaders are more accountable to the public than their autocratic counterparts
because of periodic elections (Russet, 1993; Russett and Oneal, 2001; Reiter and Stam, 2002).

7

Doyle (1983) argues that democracies may feel justified in military action against nondemocracies under the belief that such regimes threaten their way of life. Owen (1997)
continues this argument by stating that a state must be perceived as liberal by a democratic
state for that state to feel pacific towards is. Zakaria (1997) argues that democratic peace is
misleading, and that what is really at issue is liberal democratic constitutionalism, arguing that
several formally (and procedurally) democratic states are illiberal and may not be as prone to
peace as liberal democracies. This is in contrast to Russet (1993)’s assertion that it is actual
normative features of democracy that encourage nations to have peaceful relations.
Neoliberalism builds upon liberal thinkers with regards to the connection between democratic
institutions and peace, but with a more thorough grounding in modern economic theory.
Perhaps the best known set of policy ideas from neoliberalism come in the form of the so-called
Washington Consensus. This term, coined by John Williamson in 1989 (and discussed in his 1990
paper, “What Washington Means by Policy Reform”), comes from a series of ten policy
prescriptions for crisis-wracked developing nations that were broadly endorsed by Washingtonbased think tanks and which had gained a widespread following at the Treasury Department and
elsewhere. These included a restrained fiscal policy, moving away from subsidizing industry and
towards using public funds for education and infrastructure, privatization and deregulation of
industry, trade liberalization and security of private property rights. Since then, the term has
broadened to include not just these policy prescriptions, but more generally towards moving to
market-based approaches to solve economic problems. Although Williamson (2002) resists this
broader characterization of the term, it is frequently used as shorthand for a market-based
approach to international development.
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G. John Ikenberry is a liberal institutionalist, whose work focuses on the manner in which
international institutions bind states together. Ikenberry argues that stability ensues from
creating institutions which make behavior between states more predictable, easier to interpret,
and which limit the ability of a single state to deviate widely from norms built into institutional
arrangements. Ikenberry (1992, 1998) argued that in the years and decades following World War
II, the United States sought to “lock in” a significant, but intentionally limited, amount of control
through the creation of a number of international institutions. These institutions (from NATO to
the WTO) are created in a way to be favorable to the United States, but also to other participant
nations. The United States agreed to a degree of restraint in its instructions, thereby limiting its
power, but in exchange “locks in” a (relatively) favorable world order. Other nations join this
order because it institutionalizes promises that they will not be dominated or abandoned, and
that they are given a ‘voice’ in the operations of the system. Over time, these institutions
become “binding,” creating more predictable patterns of world behavior, creating a more stable
order over time. Brinkley (1997) links institution-building to the Clinton Administration through
the policy of “Enlargement,” whereby new democracies are encouraged to adopt liberal market
reforms, and new market economies are encouraged to develop a stronger, more prosperous
middle class, in the hopes of fostering democracy. “Enlargement” can be viewed in some ways as
an extension of the Democratic Peace Theory insofar as it promotes democracies within states
and trade between states as a recipe for more pacific, and stable relations, within the inter-state
system. Ikenberry treats the Western institutions that were developed in the post-WWII period
– both economic and political –as examples of this trend in practice.
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Weede (2004) argues that trade actually has a greater pacifying effect than democracy,
although this view is disputed by Goenner (2004) and Mousseau (2005). In any event, the case
of the US-Jordan Free Trade Agreement is an example of the policy of Enlargement in action. A
key objective of the Clinton Administration was to tie Jordan and Israel (and Jordan and the US)
together through trade, and eventually, democracy, as part of the Enlargement Doctrine.
Undoubtedly, the ultimate goal was to “enlarge” past Jordan and bind other Middle Eastern
nations to the West and Israel through trade, and use this as a basis for regional peace and
stability.
There is dispute amongst Liberals and Neoliberals in emphasis or arguing for the primacy of one
rationale over others. Nonetheless, a great number of Liberal and Neoliberal thinkers argue for a
positive link between the expansion of trade and peace (Polachek, 1980, Morrow, 2003; Stein
2003; Levy, 2003; Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001; Haas; 1958, Deutsch et al., 1973) Russet and
Oneal (2001) argue that trade links which democracies foster make them believe they have more
to lose than gain in a war. This is at once descriptive and prescriptive.
Bearce (2003) argues for a “commercial institutional peace,” where economic links provide both
a reason not to go to war, a means of organization for security coordination (as trading partners
may have similar security interests), and a mechanism for providing face-to-face time between
leaders at commercial summits, helping to build trust between world leaders. This thinking is
broadly along the lines of the Clinton “Enlargement” doctrine, providing an additional step of an
additional mechanism for securing peace.
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In addition, there are also a number of theorists who argue for reverse, or spontaneous,
causation for the links between liberalism and peace. Reuveny and Li (2003) argue that for
simultaneous causation of democracy and peace; on the other hand, wars reduce the probability
of democracy or democratization, and therefore, belligerent states are both less likely to be
democratic or become democratic. Reiter (2001) argues that the causality of peace is
democracy.
There is broad agreement amongst liberal and neoliberal thinkers that democracy and peace are
intertwined, even if the causal link is not well-understood or agreed upon. Neoliberals add
grounding in modern economics to this belief, and many specifically endorse the construction of
institutions as ways of preserving peace through the promotion of a stable world order.
Ikenberry and his belief in institutions as binding agents for peace were of particular influence to
the USJFTA, as evidenced by Clinton’s “Enlargement” doctrine.
Liberal institutional theory establishes, in a sense, a triad of democracy, peace and trade,
including economic development, stable governance, respect for individual liberties, and a
lowered probability of engaging in armed conflict. Neoliberalism, as articulated in the
Washington Consensus, focuses specifically on the benefits of liberalized market economic
policies as a mechanism for improving economic prosperity. In between these poles are a variety
of perspectives between on the importance and causal order of economic growth from trade,
democracy, and peace. After the First World War, the United States pursued a policy of
encouraging democracy, in the hopes of encouraging peace. Amid uncertainty over how this
triad develops, the USJFTA is an attempt to create this triad by building the trade “leg” (and only
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the one leg) first. It is an experiment in neoliberalism, in a region where the US has along had an
interest in establishing peace, and several years before a massively costly (and failed) experiment
to establish the democracy in the region. The key premise was that economic growth (resulting
from free trade) would increase standards of living, and pave the way for both political
democratization and peace.
Thus, under the “trade first” version of the neoliberal paradigm, we would expect, over time, the
growth and development of the other two “legs” of the table – movements towards
democratization, and peace. Under Ikenberry’s theory of institutionalization, we would also
expect a greater connection between Jordan and other states through membership and growth
in a greater number of international institutions and institutional frameworks.
Therefore, if this theory holds true then in the time since the implementation of the USJFTA,
Jordan would be expected to join other regional and global organizations, and those institutions
having greater ties to increasing parts of Jordanian society and government. We would expect
domestic Jordanian institutions, from civil society to the court system, to develop and
increasingly resemble those in the industrialized world. And we would expect more peace and
stability, at least in regard to Jordan’s relations with Israel. Finally, we would expect a growing
Jordanian middle class to grow institutions resembling a civil society. Together, more developed
courts and a growing civil society are considered important precursors (or harbingers) of
democracy. Evaluating the extent to which any or all of these predictions have developed in the
time since the implementation of USJFTA is a key task for this thesis.
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Realism
Political realism traces its roots to Niccolo Machivelli and Thomas Hobbes, and looks at the world
through power relationships between states. According to Hobbes, the natural state of humanity
is “the war of all against all,” (The Leviathan, 1651), leading to the later tenant of realist theory
that the international system is anarchic in nature (Waltz 1979). Machievelli (1532) argued for a
pragmatic, rather than ethical or moral, approach to governance and international relations. This
leads to the belief that success is the ultimate test of policy, measured by the preservation and
enhancement of the nation-state (ibid). These ideas, along with those of other theorists, leading
to classical realism’s belief that the “drive for power and the will to dominate [that are] held to
be fundamental aspects of human nature.”
Stemming from these beliefs, Realist theory examines the relationships between nations in
terms of recurring struggles of power manifested by reoccurring conflicts, rivalries and wars
(Jackson and Sorenson, 2007). Realist theory holds that states seek to maximize their power
(Frankel 1997), largely through military ends. Realists do differ regarding their belief of the
ultimate goal of states with regards to their power, as illustrated by a disagreement from two of
the most important realists of the mid-20th century: Hans Morgenthau (1973) who argued that
states have a Nietszche-like will to power, whereas Kenneth Waltz (1979) argued that states
merely seek to maximize their own security.
Realists tend, however, to share five key assumptions about the functioning of the world system.
First, the international system is anarchic (Waltz, 1979); no "government over governments"
exists (Claude, 1979). The second is that states inherently possess offensive military capacity
(Mearsheimer, 1995). The third, stemming from this belief, is that no state can be entirely
13

guaranteed to be benign (ibid); the fourth is that states seek to preserve their own continued
survival (ibid) and the fifth is that states are inherently rational and think strategically at
achieving their ends (ibid).
Most realists also contend that states seek to maximize their power (ibid, p. 12), an assumption
that is central to “offensive realism.” However, “defensive realists” argue that the most effective
way of achieving the fourth assumption of realism, self-preservation, is through preserving the
existing balance of power. Because states are assumed to be rational, defensive realists argue
states work to achieve this end instead of maximizing their power (Grieco 1988; Snyder 1991).
Because the international system is anarchic, realists tend to be dismissive of the binding power
of institutions in creating or stabilizing peace. In John J. Mearsheimer's "The False Promise of
International Institutions," (1995) Mearsheimer purports that, "institutions cannot get states to
stop behaving as short-term power maximizers." Realists, Mearsheimer argues, "maintain that
institutions are basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the world." As such, they
reflect an existing balance of power, instead of helping alter it.
Because states operate in an anarchic realm, have offensive capability, and cannot be assumed
to be benign, states may enter into alliances, but these are only temporary and borne out of
mutual security concerns, for example, where the fear of a common enemy overcomes the
potential threat of war with an alliance partner (Walt, 1987). However, such alliances are
necessarily temporary – today’s enemy is tomorrow’s friend against today’s ally. Realists point
to the Soviet Union’s allegiance with Nazi Germany at the outbreak of World War II as a
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paradigmatic example (see Schweller, 1994). Thus cooperation happens not out of an inherent
desire for peace, but rather to achieve strategic ends.
In general, realists are dismissive of the power of institutions such as trade agreements to alter
the balance of power, believing instead that institutions are “arenas for acting out power
relationships” (Evans and Wilson, 1992). In other words, they are created to reflect and provide a
reflection of the power distribution at a certain point of time.
Realism primarily focuses on states competing militarily, and relatively little to say on primarily
economic trade agreements – noting, for example, that nation-states’ ability to wage war
depends to a large extent on economic strength (Mearsheimer 1995). Where Liberals see trade
as mutually beneficial, Realists see trade as, if not quite a zero sum game, as a game that always
has winners and losers, and nations should only pursue trade deals if they believe they stand
more to gain than their trading partner.
Where classical Realism flows from Machiavelli’s beliefs on human nature, Neorealism, as first
articulated by Kenneth Waltz (1979) instead proposes that it is the structure of the international
system that determines behavior in international relations. Neorealism posits that all states
have similar needs (self-preservation, greater relative power), but not means of achieving them.
The anarchic nature of the international system makes it difficult to predict other states’ actions,
particularly over the long term. This causes states to be concerned with relative power gains and
losses, and they seek to maximize relative gains at all times.
Therefore, as it relates to the effects of the USJFTA, it could be said that realism and neorealism
offer no prospective predictions: Free trade agreements reflect power arrangements at a certain
15

point in time, but do not alter them (or at least, not by much). More to the point, free trade
agreements are meant to institutionalize one’s advantage from a realist view. It could be
argued, moreover, that over time, the power relationships between nation states change, and
pacts and alliances (including trade pacts) would be renegotiated to reflect these shifts.
However, that prediction is exceedingly general, and setting up defensible claims would require
several intermediate claims; for example, immediately following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the
US’s power in the region increased, putting the US “ahead” vis-à-vis the 1990s-era pact’s
negotiation; or that following the prolonged insurgency, the US was less likely to engage in any
significant new Middle Eastern intervention, or perhaps that Jordan became more or less
important to US power calculations during the prolonged Syrian civil war. Such claims could
certainly be made, but renegotiating the agreement would be a prolonged process and would
require legislative approval in both the US and Jordan, and, as the examples above illustrate,
relative power is fluid and great shifts can be claimed in a short period of time.

Dependency Theory and Other Critics
One of the key tenants of Liberal theory is that nations seek mutually beneficial relationships;
while Realists argue that nations seek to maximize their power over other states. Dependency
theorists, by contrast, argue that nations seek to secure favorable positions with respect to other
peoples, nations, or regions, and that this has occurred in the international capitalist system by
making peripheral states and societies dependent upon the core states of the capitalist West for
their economic, social or political (or all three) functions. This occurs because the nations in the
core develop economic structures for their own benefit and which ensure the nations at the
periphery require trade links with their “partner” at the core to meet their economic needs. One
16

early example of this theory is by Hirschman (1945), in National Power and the Structure of
Foreign Trade argued that mutually beneficial trade could, in time, produce cause nations to
case producing goods they required, and thereby become dependent upon their trading partner
over time. Subsequently, Prebisch (1950), in his report to the United Nations, The Economic
Development of Latin America and Its Principle Problems, found that Latin American nations were
a periphery whose resources (and the benefits of trade) flowed to the more dominant countries
of the center. As technology improves, the industrialized world accrued benefits from
technology, but the periphery was unable to accrue such benefits. This, over time, leads to
declining terms of trade for peripheral nations with the core. Singer (1950) came to similar
conclusions but used more empirical methods. These theories together became known as the
Singer-Prebisch thesis. This theory was further refined by Emmanuel (1972) who placed the
differing terms of sale for goods on wage levels in advanced economies.
Dependency theory further described how trade relations, when they become asymmetric, could
become detrimental to the weaker trading partner, and in the long run be detrimental to peace.
In a somewhat ironic twist, dependency theory and neorealists are both skeptical that greater
trade links increase peace. Dependency theorists differ as to the degree to which the dependent
nations are a necessary condition of a global capitalist system.
One highly influential argument which refutes the argument trade-generates-peace is World
Systems theory as advanced by Immanuel Wallerstein (1974, and further advanced and
somewhat altered, 1980, 1989, 2011), which argues that capitalism was generated as a
byproduct of the development of long-distance trading networks beginning in 15th century
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Europe. These networks eventually encompassed greater and greater parts of the world into
their “system,” which both necessitated and helped generate colonial systems where some
nations were intentionally brought into the system, but forced to stay at its periphery, feeding
resources to the core while being forced to import higher-end goods from the center in
necessarily dependent relationships. A similar argument was advanced by Andre Gunder Frank
(1978), who argued that the structure of the system necessitates that benefits accrue at the
core, not the periphery. Wallerstein and Frank’s theories can be seen as a response and
refutation to Rostow (1960)’s “modernization” theory which posits that each nation was
somewhere on a ladder of development, and with proper structure and encouragement, all
nations could advance to the apex of this ladder.
Nations at the periphery are coerced either through military force leading to colonialism, or
later, through more subtle forms of power, to produce primary products for the core at low
prices, and kept out of higher-end manufacturing (even through the destruction of previously
established local industries, such as the export of cotton textiles from India to Britain in the 18th
century). The periphery-core relationship ensures sources of cheap, lower end goods supported
by abundant cheap labor for the core. It also ensures that “high end” products (textiles in the
18th century or advanced telecommunication services today) remain concentrated in the core.
The periphery-core relationship effectively ‘kicks down” the ladder so that nations cannot ascend
it, except, as Wallerstein notes, by integrating themselves to the system and slowly working their
way towards the core, a spot that few nations can occupy at a time. More recently, however,
Ocampo and Parra (2003) have demonstrated that even for “middle income” nations such as
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Mexico, Thailand and China, the terms of trade have also fallen. Under dependency theory, this
demonstrates that the benefits of trade accrue to the core at the expense of the periphery.
Recent works in dependency theory have focused largely been responses to theories advanced
by neoliberals, as neoliberal theory has become dominant in both popular discourse and political
decision making (as evidenced by WTO and World Bank policies and the drive towards bilateral
FTAs by the United States and others). Dunn (2009) argues that neoliberals often create a
“straw man” argument pitting free trade against autarchy to advocate for a specific form of free
trade, namely, the free movement of capital and goods but not people.
There are other important criticisms from authors who work in other frameworks. Stiglitz, a
mainstream economist (2002) argues that market fundamentalism, placed above human needs,
creates unnecessary harm in human lives. He uses the term “market fundamentalism” to refer
to in rapid, and harmful reductions in trade barriers. He also sounds another criticism, that free
trade, as part of globalization, has meant liberalized trade in investment and goods, but not in
people or jobs – protections for migration remain firmly in place. Rodrik (1997) argues that
import substitution, that is, specific industrial protections, can help make a nation more
competitive for trade in the long run. In his work Kicking Away the Ladder, Ha-Joon Chang
similarly argues that advanced nations used protections (removed in free trade agreements)
were employed by all successfully industrialized nations, and removed only after
industrialization. Free trade agreements “kick away the ladder,” and remove the ability of more
states from employing a similar strategy. Furthermore, many critics argue that free trade has so
far only been extended to specific industries –and notably, not agriculture. Birdstall (2006) and
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an Oxfam report (Watkins and Fowler, 2002) both argue for the effective implementation of free
trade across all industries, including agriculture. On this point, they actually agree with
mainstream economists such as Bhagwati (2004), however, mainstream economics, as
articulated below, hold as a rule that a reduction of barriers in any form improves the welfare of
both trading partners on net (though this means, overall, that “winners” in trade can
compensate “losers” within one nation). Synthesizing many of the views of critics, Harvey (2005)
in his work A Brief History of Neoliberalism argues that a global elite class of capitalists have
systematically lowered barriers for capital to benefit their class, while lowering worker
protections and environmental standards as part of the neoliberal project.
Relating to American power, Wallerstein argues (2004a) that the United States has been in
decline since the 1970s, and that globalization (as seen in its post-Second World War form, with
the United States largely at the helm) has largely ended because it was based upon American
dominance in significant parts of the international arena. As such, the time for “soft
multilateralism,” such as trade pacts, is at an end, though his work does little to state what will
happen with existing pacts. However, The Modern World System (1973) seems to suggest that
hegemons enjoy a long “halo” effect even after falling; he notes the Dutch and English both
enjoyed periods of significant domestic prosperity decades (and possibly even centuries) after
the end of their hegemony. This may suggest a point of agreement with Neoliberals, who argue
for the “stickiness” of institutions.
As it relates to the USJFTA, dependency theorists would argue that Jordan would be forced to
maintain a ‘peripheral’ relationship to the United States, and export only products that require

20

large amounts of unskilled labor and relatively low amounts of capital. They would expect an
enrichment of the elites who run factories or actively engage with the core-nation trading
partner, but the majority of working-class individuals would remain in labor-intensive, lowpaying jobs and receive few of the benefits of the new trading relationship. More over,
dependency theorists (or its more contemporary variation) would predict that there would be no
widespread movement towards the production of higher-capital goods (which tend to be more
profitable), and instead, these goods would continue to be imported from core nations, with an
expectation that this would largely be from the United States due to the trade advantages of the
FTA. Because the labor force would remain in low-paying, labor-intensive jobs, we would not
expect any widespread movement towards democratization including the development of a
more rigorous judicial system. The gains expected by the Enlargement policy, in short, would
never materialize.

Free Trade: Economic Perspectives
Understanding the appeal of free trade agreements from an economic standpoint will help to
shed light on the debates discussed above, and to better understanding the rationale of the
USJFTA. This is due, in part, because the arguments of economists are used as part of neoliberal
(political) discourse to justify economic policies even over objections of labor or social welfare
groups (Harvey 2005). Economists have been largely supportive of free trade, and have based
their arguments on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Understanding these theoretical
perspectives is important in evaluating the USJFTA for multiple reasons. First, understanding the
theoretical support for, and criticisms of, free trade will help evaluate the successes and failures
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of the agreement. Second, understanding the theoretical perspectives that support and are
critical of free trade helps frame both popular perceptions and political support for free trade.
Economists have been overwhelming in their support of free trade policies. Alston, Kearl and
Vaughan (1992) in a sample of 1,350 economists found that more than 90% believed that tariffs
and import quotas – protections which are eliminated in free trade – usually reduce general
economic welfare. In their work investigating the political origins of protectionism, Mayda and
Rodrick (2005) conclude that “the consensus among mainstream economists on the desirability
of free trade remains almost universal.” This support stems from Ricardo’s Principles of Political
Economy and Taxation (1817), using an example showing that even if one nation was less
efficient at producing all goods, it could still benefit from trade using comparative advantage.
Despite nearly two centuries of economic research since then, this support has endured because
as Irwin (1996) summarizes in his investigation of the history of free trade, “The case for free
trade has endured because the fundamental proposition that substantial benefits arise from the
free exchange of goods between countries has not been overshadowed by the limited scope of
various qualifications and exceptions.”
Since Ricardo, a number of alternative explanations of comparative advantage have been
created, the best-known of which is the Heckscher-Ohlin model. This model, first developed by
Ohlin in 1933 and published in the work Interregional and International Trade (1967), develops
from the idea that nations differ in terms of inputs (labor, resources, capital), and that goods are
produced based upon different proportions of these resources. This model suggests that one of
the benefits of free trade is that, over time, prices of similar goods in two countries will tend to
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equalize, as should costs of productive resources. This theory was refined in 1941 by the
Stolper-Samuelson theory (Stolper and Samuelson, 1941) which suggests that the price of the
scarce resource in a nation should fall, and the plentiful resource should rise. Paul Samuelson is
considered one of the first and foremost neoclassical economists. This theory predicts falling
wages as a labor-scarce country trades with a country with more plentiful access to labor, but
that overall, net economic growth will increase as a result of trade, and thus, greater prosperity
will result. This theory has largely remained at the center of mainstream economic thought,
although recent work has increased the level of detail in the model.
While economists generally support free trade agreements, there remains real debate about the
extent to which labor and environmental protections can and should be included in free trade
agreements directly. Brown (2000) discusses many of the challenges of including labor and
environmental standards in the WTO. Bhagwati (1993) has noted that environmental and labor
standards are often value-laden, however, and there is evidence that those in wealthier
countries may value a cleaner environment more than those in the developing world. Bhagwati
and Hudec (1996) have a long and wide-ranging series of papers in two volumes about whether
harmonization of labor and environmental policies (and with them, the value-norms that are
associated with these policies) must be harmonized prior to free trade being implemented.
Although their authors reach no specific conclusions, the debate is weighty – and lengthy.
Richardson (1995) argues that the inclusion of a targeted set of non-tariff standards around
worker protection and technology issues might be necessary for expanded trade agreement
passage.
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A review of the literature therefore produces several distinct views about the role of free trade
agreements in international relations. While Liberalism and Neoliberalism posit that states are
concerned with absolute gains, Realism and Neorealism are concerned with relative gains and
losses between other state actors. Liberals and Neoliberals therefore view free trade
agreements, which produce absolute gains from both parties, are a stabilizing force. Some
Liberal theorists examine the links between trade, peace and democracy. Liberal institutionalists
believe that the creation of international institutions, including trade pacts, make state actions
more predictable and therefore increase international peace and stability. Although they do not
agree on the direction of causality, there is evidence that the three are connected. Under this
viewpoint, the USJFTA would raise living standards within Jordan, and foster greater ties in the
region and with the United States. These ties reduce the chance of conflict. At the same time,
the growth of the Jordanian economy would create a middle class that would demand a greater
role in governance over time, which would in turn lead to democratization, which further
supports peace.
Because Realism and Neorealism are concerned with relative gains, they believe that trade pacts,
like all other alliances, are temporary. They believe that such pacts should be viewed as
attempts by one nation to “lock in” the best position possible for a period of time, maximizing
their relative position with the other nation and with others. Therefore, changes in the relative
power between Jordan, Israel and the United States would change the behaviors of these state
actors. If Jordan found its relative power growing compared to those nations, they might seek to
renegotiate the peace treaty or FTA under more favorable terms; while if the United States grew
in power, it would seek to further constrain Jordan’s relative power in the Middle East,
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particularly as it relates to Israel, which has continues to be viewed as an important US ally in the
region.
The review of the literature also produces two distinct views on the economics of free trade
agreements. Mainstream economists argue that trade produces real benefits due to the
comparative advantages each nation enjoys. Even Free Trade Agreements with the
qualifications and exceptions of FTAs like the USJFTA, most economists believe that the treaties
create net benefits. Under this belief, we would see increased trade between Jordan and the
United States, leading to higher relative welfare in both nations, all other things being equal.
Dependency theorists, on the other hand, believe in a polar world with nations at the core and
periphery. Free Trade Agreements are one way that nations at the core attempt to lock nations
to their position at the periphery. Under this belief, FTAs lock peripheral nations (Jordan, in this
case) in to producing goods with fewer capital inputs, exporting lower-priced products to the
core, while they remain dependent upon core nations to import higher-capital goods that tend
to be more profitable.
The Enlargement doctrine created by the Clinton Administration was consciously based upon
liberal views in international relations and mainstream economic views. The USJFTA could
therefore be expected to produce greater ties between the United States, Jordan, and Israel,
which would make conflict between them less likely. Over time, the USJFTA would create
greater living standards, raising the prospect of further peace and democratization. Both
Neorealists and Dependency theorists would be skeptical of the intention of the Agreement and
would believe that these outcomes would be unlikely to materialize. The following sections of
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this thesis will evaluate the USJFTA from the perspectives of foreign policy, trade policy, and
economic aims and effects to determine which theories most accurately predicted the outcomes
of the USJFTA.
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Chapter 1: The USJFTA As a Foreign Policy
Tool
Introduction
While Free Trade Agreements are undeniably instruments of economic policy, they are also
instruments of foreign policy. It is no coincidence that the first bilateral free trade agreement
that the United States signed was with Israel, a key use ally in the Middle East, but not one of the
United States’ larger trading partners (Ruebner and Sharp, 2001). This chapter will examine the
United States Jordan Free Trade Agreement as an instrument of foreign policy. The chapter will
first discuss the shifts in Jordanian-American relations that occurred in the 1990s, as relations
warmed after Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel. This necessitates understanding
American-Israeli and Israeli-Jordanian relations. The chapter will then put the USJFTA in the
context of broader American foreign policy aims in the Middle East. The chapter will then place
the Agreement in terms of global American foreign policy aims. In 1992, President Clinton
became the first candidate elected after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and as such, his
administration needed to create an overarching goal for American foreign policy to replace
“containment.” The chapter will demonstrate that the USJFTA is the paradigmatic example of
the Clinton Administration’s policy of “Enlargement.” The chapter will then evaluate the success
of the USJFTA as a foreign policy tool.
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Historical Relations: The United States, Jordan and Israel
Early Jordan-US Relations
Jordanian-American relations are best viewed through two lenses. The first is the regional lens
of American policy, goals and aims in the Middle East region. The second is Jordan’s role in the
United States’ overarching global foreign policy aim, especially during the Cold War, when the
country was viewed as a bulwark against Soviet expansion into the Arab world. Regionally, this
chapter will argue that a key focus of the United States policy in the Middle East is the security
its allies, primarily that of Israel.
Jordan had long been considered a friend and ally of the United States against Soviet expansion.
King Abdullah I gave a fervent speech against the growth of communism at the 1960 UN General
Assembly meeting where Khrushchev famously banged a shoe (bin Talal, 1962, pp. 200-207 for
text of King Hussein’s speech). The United States and Jordan had never signed a formal treaty of
alliance or mutual protection (Bolle, 2001), but their interests were very much aligned. Even in
the decade prior, the United States had grown to be considered Jordan's primary Western
backer. Although the amount of support Jordan received was not particularly large, it was
enough to keep Jordan’s government loyal to the United States (Braizat, 1995).
American views towards Jordan and its relationship with Israel have been more nuanced, and
often strained. As described below, Jordan’s relationship with Israel was uniquely strained given
Jordan’s location, history and ethnic makeup. Jordan, like many other Arab states, was created
as an emirate with an Emir hand-selected by Europeans and later, a self-governing King.
Following the declaration of Israeli independence, Jordan received an influx of Palestinian
refugees and fought with other Arab states against the nascent Israel in 1948. As an Arab state,
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Jordan was under intense pressure to support Palestinian territorial claims and the pursuant
struggle against Israel. It also served, due to its population and position neighboring Israel, as a
launching point for attacks into Israel by Palestinian groups. Its location also made it vulnerable
to Israeli attacks, and Israeli retaliations to Palestinian attacks. Together, these twin challenges to
Jordanian sovereignty – from Palestinian organizations operating within Jordanian territory, and
from external Israeli attacks – tempered, and ultimately determined Jordanian-Israeli relations,
along a halting, but ultimately successful, quest for peace between the two nations.

The Halting Path to Peace Between Israel and Jordan
For a half century, the United States’ Middle Eastern policy has hinged upon its relationship with
Israel, and as a nation sharing a border with Israel, Jordanian-American relations cannot be
understood without understanding the importance of Israeli-American relations. Since it became
a state, Israel has been the largest recipient of US foreign aid and bilateral military aid (Sharp,
2010). Bar-Siman-Tov (1998) and Little (1993) discuss American-Israeli relations as a “special
relationship,” though they differ in exactly how the relationship came about. Both of their
“special relationship” theories argue, essentially, that the United States shares features in
common with Israel that make the nation a key US partner in the region. This, in turn, is used to
justify treating Israel exceptionally in the region. Both generally agree that the US thought of a
democratic Israel as a stabilizing force against Arab nationalism, which presented a threat to
American economic interests in the region and may have opened the region as a new front in
the Cold War. Western democracies (led by the US) vied for regional influence with the USSR by
offering economic and military aid to various nations in the region. Israel’s “special relationship”
has been documented alternatively as far back the Kennedy Administration (Bar-Simian-Tov
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1998). Reich (1999) argues that the 1967 War caused the United States to view Israel as the
most significant counterweight to Soviet-supported leftist Arab nationalism.
Part of the reason for this “special relationship” is also the effectiveness of the “Israel lobby” in
American politics. Mearsheimer and Walt (2007) argue that the United States’ detail the
extensive support – financial, diplomatic, material (including military) and public – the country
gives Israel and argue that such levels of support go beyond what could be expected on strategic
or moral grounds. Such support is based instead on a small group of active donors within the
United States. Part of the reason that this lobby has been successful has been the advocacy by
the Christian right in the United States to “stand by” Israel (Drinan, 1977), leaving the pro-Israel
lobby with significant resources from a variety of sources, while the Arab American community
remains comparatively weak in American politics. This means that a key goal for American
foreign policy in the Middle East is ensuring the peace and stability of Israel.
Jordan had long claimed territory which Israel captured in the 1967 war (The Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan 1999), and also had ongoing disputes on water rights as well as Jordan's
recognition of Palestinian territories (US Department of State, 1994). Given these constraints
and the importance of Israel not just as a recognized American ally but also as a key source of
lobbying in the United States, closer coordination between the United States and Jordan was
unthinkable given an ongoing state of conflict across the Jordan River.
Israeli-Jordanian relations slowly, and haltingly, grew closer (if not exactly warmer) over the
course of several decades prior to their official peace treaty and were due to a recognition of
similar interests as much as an abstract desire for peace. Back-channel doors had been open
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between cabinet-level ministers since at least the 1960s (Shemesh 2010). Although these talks
were tentative and both sides carried a degree of suspicion, and the two nations had major
differences in their commitment to achieving peace in this time period (ibid), both nations
developed “working relationships” before a formal relationship as they recognized they shared a
number of security concerns.
In part, progress towards peace is due to the fact that unlike many of the more belligerent
leaders in the region at the time, then-King Hussein seemed to have an actual dedication to
peace, despite the need to build domestic and (Arab) regional political support through opposing
Israel and supporting the case for Palestinian claims. The need for domestic and regional political
considerations limited Hussein’s freedom of action in ways that the Israelis both did and did not
fully appreciate (ibid). Despite these challenges, covert talks continued, largely due to a growing
awareness in the late 1960s that both the Jordanian government and the state of Israel faced
shared security challenges from armed Palestinian organizations operating in their territories.

Israel, Jordan and Palestinians: A Complex Relationship
Following the declaration of Israeli statehood, Jordan had taken in hundreds of thousands of
Palestinian refugees and annexed the West Bank and its hundreds of thousands of Palestinian
residents (Bolle, Prados and Sharp, 2007). Taken together, these Palestinian populations formed
a majority of the population of Jordan. Hence, the government feared the possible effects of an
independent (Palestinian) West Bank on the ability of Jordan to survive as a state. Following the
1967 Six Day war, Israel took control of the West Bank, causing a further exodus of Palestinian
refugees into Jordan. These refugees further taxed Jordanian police and military forces charged
with protecting and safeguarding the refugee camps, with Palestinian Liberation Organization
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(PLO) members setting up quasi-governmental institutions, including uniformed officers carrying
weapons throughout some camps, security checkpoints, and mechanisms to collect various
forms of taxes (Shemesh, 2010).
Attempts to negotiate a settlement between the Hashemite government of Jordan and the PLO
failed. It did not help that the PLO splintered into various factions, with different groups
receiving various forms of aid and encouragement from a number of Arab states. Having a
coordinated policy (let alone making peace) was problematic at best. The result was a series of
clashes between Jordanian security forces and PLO factions. PLO militias simultaneously used
bases within Jordan as launching points for attacks into Israel (Hertsog and Gazit, 2005). The
Hashemite Jordanian government, therefore, faced challenges to its rule internally, from the
“state within a state” developing in Palestinian areas (which together, formed a majority of the
population of the nation). There was also the looming threat of invasion from Israel, which
sought to end incursions into its territory originating from within Jordanian borders (ibid). The
conflict was further fueled by United Nations Resolution 242, which called for the West Bank to
come under Jordanian authority as part of an eventual peace plan, which was unacceptable to a
swath of Palestinian organizations (ibid). As a result, these organizations stepped up their
attacks on the Jordanian government and the government attempted bolder moves against the
armed Palestinian groups within its borders.
The situation reached a climax in 1970, when the Jordanian government took a number of
contradictory actions, both reacting to events from Palestinian groups and creating new
problems. The government first passed a series of laws that sought to severely curtail the ability
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of Palestinian groups to operate within Jordanian territory. The government then removed an
openly anti-Palestinian minister and issued a series of statements in support of Palestinian
fighters opposing Israel. Unmoved by the King’s statement in support of Palestinians, the PLO
began setting up a number of checkpoints and visa controls within the Palestinian territory, and
one of the largest PLO subgroups dramatically hijacked three airliners, diverted them to Jordan,
and destroyed them after removing hostages (Snow and Philips, 1971). This, along with
contemporaneous attempts to assassinate the King of Jordan, forced Jordan to declare martial
law. The goal of these actions was to bring the autonomous Palestinian regions under full
Jordanian control. Syria intervened in support of the Palestinian fighters, prompting a state of
near-panic from King Hussein (Shemesh, 2010). At this time, the government pleaded for
support from Britain, the US and, intriguingly, Israel. Israel responded with surveillance flights of
Syrian forces, which, along with other factors, prompted a swift Syrian retreat, leading to a rout
of Palestinian forces in Jordan and allowing for the consolidation of control of Jordan under
Hashemite rule (ibid).
Although Jordan did not receive as much Israeli support as it had hoped for, what it had received
was sufficient, and the events of what became known as Black September demonstrated that
both Israel and Jordan had similar interests in opposing PLO expansion. More broadly, both
states benefitted greatly from support and collaboration from Western powers (Hertsog and
Gazit, 2005). Both nations realized that, whatever their differences, neither wanted to see the
PLO better armed, trained or equipped to fight. Although Palestinian statehood was the PLO’s
stated goal, they seemed more than willing to take control of Jordan and eliminate the current
Hashemite government as a means to this end. This made Jordan feel, like Israel, that the PLO
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threatened the country’s security. This recognition lead Jordan to begin its covert peace talks
with Israel in the late 1980s. Although these negotiations failed to produce a treaty, they did
result in in Jordan abandoning its claims to the West Bank in 1989.
The normalization of relations between Jordan and Israel came to fruition in the aftermath of the
Oslo peace process. In 1994, President Clinton, King Hussein and Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin
signed the Washington Declaration, which created a formal and public framework for an IsraeliJordanian peace treaty. By October, a formal agreement was signed, representing an early coup
for Clinton's foreign policy in the Middle East. The Clinton Administration provided a major
incentive designed to move the Jordanians to sign a peace when it promised to forgive Jordanian
debts to the United States after a treaty was signed.

Creating Jordan's Peace Dividend
In addition to forgiving Jordanian debt, the Clinton Administration sought to create a “peace
dividend” for Jordan, just as it did after Egypt after that country and Israel normalized ties in
1979 (Sharp, 2005). In the years following the normalization of relations with Israel, Egypt
became a major beneficiary of American aid; in fact, it became the second largest non-NATO
recipient of American military aid after Israel (US Department of State, 2014). A decade after
achieving peace, Egypt was designated as a “major non-NATO ally,”(MNNA) a distinction it
shared with Israel, allowing it special access to both American military technology as well as
financing to procure American weaponry (Jones, 1998). It also became a major recipient of
American aid for economic development. The Clinton Administration felt that a similarly large
dividend was necessary for Jordan (Prados, 2003). The goal was twofold. First, the dividend
needed to solidify the newfound peace, and second, it needed to provide Jordan with tangible
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benefits to smooth over any negative sentiments about the peace treaty with the Jordanian
population. Finally, a goal was to provide a visible example of the benefits of normalizing
relations with Israel to other countries in the region, to encourage them to follow suit.
The Clinton Administration was left to decide what forms this peace dividend would take. The
first “dividend” was the elimination of Jordan's $700 million in official debt to the United States
(Prados, 2003, the report notes that the actual cost to US taxpayers was $400 million due to
accounting methods). Following that, Jordan became a larger recipient of American economic
aid. Within a year of signing the peace treaty, Jordan's annual economic support funds
appropriation was also increased by over 40% (Jones, 1998). The Administration also sought to
provide Jordan with military aid. Military aid visibly signals that the United States believes that a
country is a stable ally. In 1995, Jordan was granted $220 million in "no-cost, low-cost" financing
to purchase a squadron of F-16 fighter jets (a fighter type which it should be noted that Israel
also flies); approving this request initially stalled in Congress and was only granted with explicit
lobbying from Israel. One headline in a defense-industry publication, in a twist of unintentional
ironic humor, noted that the "Fighters Would Serve as Symbol of Peace" (Faraj and Finnegan,
1995).
A year later, Jordan was granted the same MNNA designation as Egypt (Clinton, 1996), which
may partly have been to reinforce to the Jordanians that they now had parity with the other
Arab neighbor which had signed a peace treaty with Israel. This designation is reserved for
nations which have a "unique and strategic US interest," (Jones, 1998), use a wide array of US
military technology which it would be in American interest to keep up-to-date, or which have a
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significant research and development base which could further American military technology
(ibid). In announcing the designation, a State Department spokesman explicitly noted the IsraeliJordanian peace treaty as a reason behind the move, and discusses the need to "support" the
Jordanian king "as he advances the cause of peace" (Davies, 1996).
Out of all nations which have been designated as MNNA, it is telling that only Jordan and Egypt
have not created a joint R&D program. According to a memo obtained by Jones (1998),
administration officials knew that the status would bring "few substantial benefits to Jordan"
which it did not already possess (Jordan already had access, as a matter of policy, to US
munitions and joint training with the US military which the MNNA status provides), but it would
give Jordan a "privileged status." These first rewards for Jordan were highly similar to the
treatment that Egypt had already received since coming to peaceful terms with Israel. Even with
the erasure of Jordanian debt, increases in aid amounts, sale of fighter jets and MNNA status,
there had been "an absence of significant economic benefits," (ibid) which were seen as
important to provide to the Jordanian government in light of an "increasingly restive populace,"
whose support of the peace treaty with Israel, and hardened stance to Iraq, was rocky at best.
In addition to visibly signaling Jordan’s newfound status as a US ally from a security perspective,
there was therefore also an identified need to provide real economic benefits to Jordan that
could translate into higher living standards for the population. There are hints of the Clinton
Administration's thinking on how these benefits might be created in the Israeli-Jordanian peace
treaty, which stipulated that a free trade zone would be created by the two nations, in the form
of Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ). These QIZ were designed to be a sort of "pass through" for
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goods destined for the United States'. The goods produced in the zones were to be treated as if
they were made in Israel and thereby enter the United States without higher tariffs (Bolle,
Prados and Sharp, 2006). QIZ were authorized as an amendment to the enabling legislation for
the US-Israel Free Trade Agreement at the request of the Clinton Administration.
The largest share for Jordan's “peace dividend” would then be primarily economic. Unlike Egypt,
where aid promises frequently came in the form of specific projects (such as the Aswan Dam,
which the United States had plans to fund until American officials viewed Nasser, then President
of Egypt, as favoring the Soviet Union (Kyle, 1991)), Jordan would instead receive preferential
trade treatment. The peace treaty, like the later Free Trade Agreement the nation would sign
with the United States, would seek to bind the economic future of Jordan with that of Israel,
promoting greater bilateral ties as a means of expanding trade, with the United States seen as an
obvious trading partner.
Why these ties took the form they did lies partly in the Clinton Administration's response to the
foreign policy challenges and opportunities which were created as a result of the end of the Cold
War, and its liberal vision of economic and democratic “Enlargement.” It was also due, in part,
to the political realities of a Republican Congress that was determined to limit new spending
outlays. Nonetheless, the same thinking that informed economic emphasis of the Jordan-Israeli
peace treaty would later shape the United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement. Understanding
the unique foreign policy situation the Clinton Administration faced, and the path it would chart
to navigate the post-Cold War world, is necessary in explaining both why the United States
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would choose to negotiate a bilateral free trade agreement with Jordan, and why the agreement
would take on some of its unique characteristics and provisions.

The Clinton Administration Policy of Enlargement
New Direction After the Fall of the Soviet Union
The Clinton Administration entered office at a unique time in American history. After the Soviet
Union fell, the United States found itself literally unparalleled in most definitions of power and
strength: It was the world’s largest economy, had greater military spending than the next six
highest spenders combined (four of whom were American allies), and had significant advantages
in high technology, and research and development. During the Cold War, whatever advantages
the United States may have enjoyed were checked, at least in part, by the Soviet Union. The
Cold War gave American foreign policy a singular, overarching objective, one yardstick by which
success could largely be measured: Beat the Russians. Foreign wars in regions with no obvious
geopolitical significance to the United States (like Vietnam) were justified as worthwhile because
of the need to check the expansion of Communism. A large military presence in Western Europe
could be justified to check a hypothetical Soviet invasion. Popular leaders in Central America
could be overthrown if they were perceived as being too close to communism or the USSR. Even
rockets to the moon could be justified as a reasonable expense if only to prove American
competence in technologies. After the Soviet Union fell, however, the United States suddenly
lacked a single overarching foreign policy goal. Would there still be a large American military
presence in Europe? How would America treat despots and revolutionaries now that
communism had, in effect, been not just checked but checkmated? As these questions were
being asked, the United States was in a singular position of strength.
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Despite the global significance of these questions (both to the United States and other nations
around the globe), how the United States would respond to these questions was left open for an
extended period of time. During the 1992 election cycle, then-candidate Clinton’s campaign
strategist James Carville famously told staffers that the campaign message was “it’s the
economy, stupid” (Kelly, 1992). Given the election results, it is telling that President George HW
Bush’s re-election hopes had been largely pinned on foreign policy and his 90% approval rating
following immediately following the Gulf War (Agiesta, 2007). Clinton’s victory, then, highlighted
the primary importance of the economy in the election, and conversely, foreign policy’s limited
impact in the ballot box even as the world outside the United States was rapidly changing with
the end of the Cold War.
Candidate Clinton was initially spared the need to articulate a detailed foreign policy, past the
broad goals of military restructuring, promoting democracy, and elevating the role of economics
(Brinkley, 1997). President Clinton, in the first few months of his office “made only four major
foreign policy speeches,” all of which “stressed continuity with his predecessor’s policies” (ibid).
Clinton’s foreign policy was criticized by Leslie Gelb, then President of the influential Council on
Foreign Relations as being merely an trade policy, instead of a foreign policy – in the realm of
international diplomacy, as in the election, it was all apparently 'still the economy.'

From Containment to Enlargement: Articulating a Foreign Policy Doctrine
In the context of such criticism, members of Clinton’s administration took the ideas that
candidate Clinton had articulated, and asked to formulate those broad concepts that into a
grand strategy, and finally to find an attractive name for the policy. The winning name was
“enlargement,” and was defined as the need to “strengthen the community of market
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democracies… foster and consolidate new democracies and market economies… counter the
aggression and support the liberalization of states hostile to democracy, and help democracy
and market economies to take root in regions of greatest humanitarian concern” (ibid,
summarizing a speech given by National Security adviser Anthony Lake). The order of this
summary of the policy as important to its description as items in the summary themselves, as
becomes clear when seeing how the policy was framed and packaged from its initial introduction
onwards. Lake, then-National Security Advisor for the Clinton Administration, sought a term that
would be more than just a “grab all euphemism,” but would “merge strands of neo-Wilsonian
idealism with hard-core neo-Morganthauian realism” (ibid), Enlargement sought to make policy
out of the so-called “neo-neo synthesis.”
In describing Enlargement, Lake spelled out the hallmarks Clinton’s foreign policy over the next
seven years. Enlargement was presented as the logical extension of the Cold War policy of
Containment. Containment was recast as a defensive policy when Communism was a threat to
market democracies. With that threat gone, the emphasis could become offensive, of enlarging
the global sphere of market democracies. Foreign policy and domestic policy were becoming
inevitably intertwined given mutual benefits from trade: "The line between foreign and domestic
policy has evaporated," Lake (1993) proclaimed. Success abroad could be defined largely by
success at home: A successful American foreign policy would keep Americans safe while
enriching them through trade. The end of the Cold War meant that American ideals had lost
their main opponent, and it was time to consolidate and expand upon the sphere of the world
where they were enacted.
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“Enlargement” was designed to be both aspirational and operational: It would lay out a positive
blueprint for the aims of American foreign policy while also delivering real benefits in the real
world. Lake articulated four goals for Enlargement at his speech at Johns Hopkins University on
September 21st, 1993: The United States would work to “strengthen the community of market
democracies;” “foster and consolidate new democracies and market economies where possible,”
“support the liberalization of states hostile to democracy.” America’s humanitarian agenda
would best be served if we “help democracy and market economies take root” (Lake 1993,
emphasis added). The speech emphasized that the strategy must be “pragmatic” and “befriend
non-democratic states for mutually beneficial reasons.”
The Liberal (in both the economic and international relations sense) basis of the Clinton policy
was clearly evident in Lake’s speech. Democratic and market freedoms were seen as
intertwined, and the success of one would lead to the success of the other. “Both processes [of
developing democratic freedoms and market economies] strengthen each other,” Lake (ibid)
explained, “democracy alone can produce justice, but not the material goods necessary for
individuals to thrive; markets alone can expand wealth, but not that sense of justice without
which civilized societies perish.” These two freedoms were seen as transcending cultures and
regions (ibid), and so could and should be “sold” to the entire world. Where there was an
opportunity to create, consolidate or strengthen even nascent democracies or market reforms, it
would be the mission of the United States to help grow these seeds, “especially in states of
special significance,” (ibid) a situation which may have later explained the moves towards the
USJFTA. Lake noted specifically that Enlargement would sometimes mean supporting and
defending non-democratic states due to mutually aligned interests (ibid), such as support for
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America's key ally, Israel. Nonetheless, the basic premise of the liberal vision – democratic
governments within states, trade between states, and international institutions to bind states –
was embodied in the policy of enlargement.
Enlargement was positioned as the reverse of the “domino theory” that drove American decision
making during the Cold War. As autocratic regimes fell, newly elected leaders would be
expected to deliver greater personal freedoms and economic prosperity to maintain legitimacy.
The policy was to deliberately search for the “dominoes” that seemed poised to tip over already:
“We should be on the lookout for states whose entry into the camp of market democracies may
influence the future direction of an entire region” (Lake 1993). In doing so, the goal was to both
strengthen and stabilize the Western-oriented international economic order. Even in remaining
autocratic regimes, a move towards market-orientation would strengthen the middle class, both
in their number and in their political importance and perceived importance to the global
economy. These middle-class consumers would be expected, of course, to consume a growing
quantity of American goods and thereby benefit the American economy, even as they worked to
create a system that would ultimately be more fertile for American-style markets and
democracy.
The Middle East peace process “was considered to be important to the global economy,” (ibid)
and thus would remain a priority even as more broad humanitarian concerns were deemphasized from American foreign policy. Enlargement stemmed from the Liberal and
Neoliberal belief that peace, economic development, and democratization were interrelated,
and that these forces could stop the growth and spread of extremism. While academics
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disagreed on the causality between these relationships, Enlargement was a bet that economic
development could be causal, and that economic liberalization would bring about growing
prosperity. After that, economic and political gains from become mutually reinforcing. Lake's
speech makes note of the importance of humanitarian concerns but it is clear that the speech
was written at a time that the costs - both direct and in American lives - of such missions were in
the forefront. Enlargement gave a strategic and intellectual rationale for structuring foreign
policy around "low-hanging fruit," nations which were already taking steps towards
democratization or a market based economy. The hope was that over time, the benefits to
“joining” the (American-led) global regime of liberalized markets and support for liberal
democracy and peaceful economic competition would spread as nations saw their “enlarged”
neighbors prosper and sought to emulate their successes by joining the ‘Enlarged sphere’
themselves.
Viewed through the lens of Enlargement, bilateral free trade agreements hold appeal from
multiple angles. They exist at the nexus between economic and foreign policy, which, under
Enlargement, might have been viewed merely as different sides of the same coin. First and
foremost, an FTA could move a nation definitively towards the path of an open, market-oriented
economy, and they directly expose a country to the American economy, market, and through
that, to American society. Bilateral FTAs, as negotiated, tend to have any number of definitions,
restrictions and "clarifications" on the way that markets should work within signatory nations.
(These help ensure, for example, that a signatory nation doesn't subsidize industries in unfair
ways, or merely take goods from another country, place a new label on them, then ship them
onwards.) These can be used to promote the development of American-style market-based
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economies, and additionally, to achieve any other number of ends connected to production, law
or labor. The closer connection of economics to politics was not lost on commentators. Lake
mentions now effectively is measured by economics as much as democracy, a fact which didn’t
escape journalist Martin Walker, writing in 1996 on Clinton’s foreign policy: “The age of
geopolitics has given way to an age of geo-economics... the great international encounters are
the trade pact” (Walker, 1996). In an era of globalization, where the growth of market-based
economies was no longer checked by the Soviet Union, focusing on the primacy of geoeconomics to achieve geo-political goals makes logical sense.
Over time, the hope of Enlargement is that the reduction in trade barriers between the United
States and signatory nations would engender the development and growth of a significant
middle class, with stakes both in the economic health of the nation, and, thereby, in the
functioning of a predictable judicial system with significant rule of law. The middle class would
become significant stakeholders in having a strong, functioning government; in other words, it
would help create a group of people who would have a stake in democratization.

The USJFTA: Basic Elements and Evaluation
It is in this context that the United States embarked upon negotiations for a free trade pact with
Jordan. As the only free trade agreement primarily negotiated under the Clinton Administration,
the pact can be viewed as the paradigmatic example of Clinton’s Enlargement strategy. Jordan
was ideally positioned as a test case in a number of ways; it is a small nation, and thus, unlike the
trade agreement with a much more economically significant Canada or Mexico, the American

44

negotiators had a greater ability to draft the agreement on their own terms. Jordan had been
economically unimportant to the United States, and there was, as described in the next chapter,
no significant domestic economic group or lobby which would be the obvious "loser" if an FTA
was signed with Jordan – so unlike the opposition to NAFTA, it was hard to say that there were a
great number of American jobs "on the line." Jordan was now, following the peace treaty with
Israel, firmly in the camp of "American ally." Furthermore, the Middle East had long been a
special interest for American foreign policy at least since President Carter negotiated the IsraeliEgyptian Camp David Accord in 1978, but progress towards that goal had been halting, at best.
One of the significant hopes of Enlargement was that its successes would snowball - that once
Jordan succeeded, its neighbors would scramble to receive the same benefits and treatment that
Jordan did. This opened the prospect that Enlargement could finally provide the "formula" for
achieving peace in the Middle East after decades of failed attempts.
The USJFTA has many similarities to NAFTA in its scope and aims. Khasawneh and al Khouri
(2002) summarize the pact’s main provisions. Tariffs on trade between the US and Jordan would
be eliminated on a staged basis. The United States would eliminate tariffs on most Jordanian
goods almost immediately, while Jordan’s government, which was more dependent upon tariff
revenue, would reduce them at a slower schedule. The schedule ranged from a two-year phase
out for tariffs under 5% to a decade for tariffs over 20%. The United States granted Jordan an
exception on tariff elimination for some goods such as automobiles, cigarettes and alcohol due
to their importance to Jordanian government revenue. Both nations also liberalized access to
service markets, although Jordan’s ascension to the WTO had a greater effect in this regard than
the FTA. The USJFTA also provides for the protection of intellectual property rights and prevents
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both countries from placing custom duties or other trade restrictions on e-commerce (a first for
a US-affiliated free trade agreement). The Agreement also provides for labor and environmental
protection in its main text, also a first for an FTA with the United States. These provisions are
evaluated in the next chapter. Finally, the USJFTA provides for consulting to encourage
transparency and head off potential issues before they become trade disputes; the Agreement
also contains procedures for dispute settlement if such efforts are unsuccessful.
To begin, the Agreement was designed to solidify the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan,
and prevent “backsliding” into hostilities. The Agreement sought to do this by providing benefits
to the citizens of Jordan by using the Agreement to create and support employment and wage
growth in Jordan. Before the Agreement was signed, these benefits were tied directly to the
Israeli peace process in form of Qualified Industrial Zones. The Agreement was a second means
of supporting employment and wage growth in Jordan. Supporting job and wage growth in
Jordan forms the second foreign policy goal of the Agreement, and is evaluated in the third
chapter. A third goal of the agreement was to encourage other Arab nations to follow Jordan
toward improved ties with Israel. The hope was that a successful Agreement, combined with the
other elements of Jordan’s peace dividend, would provide a model for others to emulate. Taken
together, success along these goals would provide a successful example for the Clinton
Administration’s policy of Enlargement, and would solidify the policy’s use by future
administrations. In the long run, it would also create a world with more stable market-oriented
democracies, the fourth goal of the USJFTA. Finally, the hope was that the Agreement, through
increased economic stability and (possibly, as per Enlargement) democratization,
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The question, then, is whether or not these goals were achieved. Foreign policy is notoriously
difficult to evaluate, but, based upon the aforementioned goals, one can make a determination
about the relative success of the Agreement. On the first count, Jordan and Israel have
maintained a strong relationship that has shown an ability to withstand tension and grow over
time. This relationship is particularly evident in terms of energy production. Jordan has long had
an issue with energy supplies, and had sought nuclear power technology from the United States,
to which the Israelis voiced objections (Bar’el 2010). This resulted in Americans withdrawing
support for Jordanian nuclear power, leaving Jordan without a solution to its energy problem.
Showcasing the broad working nature of the Jordanian-Israeli relationship, in 2014 Israel agreed
to provide Jordan with $500 million a year of natural gas from its fields in the Mediterranean
Sea, alleviating Jordan’s energy issues after supplies from Egypt, Jordan’s former principal
supplier, were interrupted (Yaakov et al 2014). Their relationship has also weathered tension
over holy sites in Israel that were placed under Jordanian administration in the peace treaty
(Welsh 2014). Independent observers (Welsh, 2014) and even critics have commented on the
“closeness” of the Israeli-Jordanian relationship (Abu Amer, 2016). The USJFTA is not the sole, or
even primary, reason for this enduring relationship between Israel and Jordan. As argued earlier
in this chapter, Jordan and Israel found that they had common interests, particularly on
Palestinian issues. However, the USJFTA should be viewed as a key aspect of Jordan’s “peace
dividend.”
The second goal of the agreement was to encourage economic growth and development in
Jordan, increasing employment and providing benefits. Giving the significance of this goal to the
broader question of free trade policies writ large, it is evaluated in detail in the third chapter.
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The third goal was to create a substantial enough peace dividend for Jordan so that other Arab
nations would be encouraged to follow suit. On this front, the USJFTA has not been successful.
No Arab nations have signed a peace treaty with Israel since Jordan, (though this may have more
to do with regional events than the success or failure of the USJFTA). Several Arab nations, such
as Qatar and Bahrain established trade relations with Israel in the 1990s, providing hope that full
diplomatic relations could ensue; however, both missions were closed by the opening years of
the 21st century (Machowski, 2011). It seems, however, that, as happened with Jordan, covert
ministerial-level contacts in support of the peace process have occurred in recent years (Ravid,
2011), meaning that public statements do not necessarily tell the full story of the state of
relations. However, expecting other Arab nations to follow Jordan’s example was always a high
bar to pass. It took 25 years after Egypt normalized relations with Israel for Jordan to follow suit.
Furthermore, as argued earlier in this chapter, Jordan was unique amongst Arab states in
believing that the PLO provided a threat to its security, creating shared interests between Jordan
and Israel that other Arab states, and Gulf states in particular, do not share with Jordan.
The third and fourth goals – of the USJFTA as an example of “Enlargement,” using marketoriented reforms to support the creation of a middle class and eventual democratization of
Jordan, and the use of the USJFTA to support Jordan’s stability by providing it with economic
opportunities and hard-currency earnings alongside new jobs for its citizens, can be evaluated
partially at best. The Clinton Administration’s “Enlargement” policy was an overarching
framework to combine trade policy along with long-term American goals of human rights and
democratization. The term was not widely used even by the Clinton Administration, and was not
used by later presidents. The USJFTA, however, can still be evaluated by the stated goals of
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Enlargement, which believed that market-oriented reforms would support the creation of a
middle class, leading to eventual democratization. The third chapter evaluates the economic
success of the Agreement, but it’s fair to say that the USJFTA has not been a significant provider
of middle class jobs in Jordan. It has, however, provided the country with billions of US dollars
per year, even if it has not eliminated Jordan’s trade deficit or solved all of its economic issues
(see Chapter 3 for economic data).
However, Jordan has proven to be remarkably stable, and has shown an ability to carry out
successful political reforms. As the Arab Spring caused uprisings – and often violent overthrows
of governments and subsequent reprisals, only Jordan and Morocco maintained their existing
governments and implement constitutional reforms (Amnesty International, 2016). The
government has remained in power, which places Jordan in a relatively unique place out of the
“oil-poor” Arab states. Unlike nations like Egypt, Libya and Yemen, Islamist uprisings haven’t
turned violent. Although there were protests in Jordan, and the government went through a
number of prime ministers and cabinets as the government sought an acceptable way to provide
reforms without losing security, in the end the government implemented constitutional reforms
that brought Islamist groups into the political fold and had them participate in recent elections
(they had boycotted an earlier election in 2013). This led the American NGO Freedom House to
move Jordan to its list of “partially free” countries from “not free” – making it one of only three
countries in the region to be labelled “not free” (the others are Israel, “free,” and Kuwait and
Lebanon, “partly free”) (Freedom House, 2017).
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None of these results, of course, could be entirely attributed to the United States-Jordan Free
Trade Agreement. The USJFTA was part of a series of “peace dividends” given to Jordan, starting
with debt relief, and including military benefits, along with the economic-oriented USJFTA and
QIZ programs. Furthermore, neither the successes nor the failures of Jordan towards
democratization could truly be attributed solely to a trade agreement. Finally, to the extent that
Jordan has been unique, both through signing a peace treaty with Israel and in its ability to bring
Islamist groups into the political fold following constitutional reforms, these characteristics have
much more to do with Jordan’s existing characteristics as they do with anything that the
American government did (or could have done) to encourage Jordan. However, to the extent
that governments have limited foreign policy tools, it would seem that the USJFTA has been a
tool that has helped encourage Jordanian stability and prosperity, and as such, can be regarded
as a successful, if not omnipotent tool of foreign policy.

Conclusion
Evaluating the United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement should be done through a number of
different perspectives. This chapter evaluated the USJFTA as a tool of foreign policy, both in how
it relates to American goals in the Middle East and in terms of how it relates to global American
foreign policy aims. Regionally, this chapter argued that the Agreement came as part of Jordan’s
“peace dividend” for normalizing relations with Israel. Israel is viewed as a (or the) key US ally in
the region, and as such, steps that support Israel’s security and stability are highly important.
This chapter evaluated the history of Jordanian-Israeli relations to demonstrate that Jordan’s
perspective on Israel, even in decades prior to the formal peace treaty, was unique amongst
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Arab nations. Both Jordanian and Israeli governments came to view Palestinian groups, and the
PLO in particular, as a threat to their sovereignty, creating a shared interest that eventually
expanded to the point where normalized Israeli-Jordanian relations were possible.
The Clinton Administration actively sought to support the Israeli-Jordanian peace process,
serving as a mediator through negotiations, and providing Jordan with an incentive, in the form
of $700 million of debt relief if a peace treaty was signed. The Administration recognized the
need to create a significant peace dividend for Jordan after a peace treaty was signed for two
reasons. First, the peace dividend was designed to visibly demonstrate the benefits of
normalizing relations with Israel to other nations in the region, in hopes that they might follow
suit. Second, the Administration sought to encourage economic growth and stability in Jordan to
head off any potential unrest or unease from the population about the peace treaty by providing
tangible economic benefits to normal Jordanians.
In addition to the debt relief, the Administration pursed the first aim through a variety of means,
including selling F-16 fighter jets to Jordan at a “low cost, no cost” financing rate, and naming
Jordan to be a Major Non-NATO Ally, a designation that it would share with Egypt (the first Arab
nation to make peace with Israel), Israel and major American allies in the pacific including Japan
and South Korea. The Administration pursued the second aim through the creation of a
Qualified Industrial Zone program, designed to foster Jordanian-Israeli economic ties, and
through the United States Jordan Free Trade Agreement.
The Israeli-Jordanian peace came about shortly after the end of the Cold War. As the first
president elected after the end of the Cold War, it was up to Clinton and his administration to
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create a new overarching goal for global American foreign policy to replace the previous policy of
“Containment.” The Administration settled on “Enlargement,” which deliberately sought to
merge economic and foreign policy along three aims: strengthen existing market democracies,
encourage new democracies and market economies, and support the liberalization of nondemocratic, non-market oriented countries. The underlying theory behind Enlargement is the
belief that economic liberalization encourages the growth of a prosperous middle class who will
take on an increasing role in the economy, and as a result, the politics, of a nation. The USJFTA
fits perfectly within this framework: Jordan had begun a process of economic liberalization and
the peace treaty with Israel underscored the possibility of political liberalization. The hope was
that the Agreement would lead to increased trade and economic opportunities in Jordan, which
would be filled by a growing middle class, who, in time, would earn an increasing role in political
decisions in Jordan.
The USJFTA as a tool of foreign policy should therefore be evaluated from the perspective of
American aims in the Middle East and in terms of how well it does at achieving the goals of
Enlargement. From these perspectives, the Agreement has been a qualified success, although it
is difficult to attribute success or failure along any criteria solely to a single foreign policy tool. It
therefore generally provides evidence for the Liberal theory of international relations of which
the Clinton Administration was consciously aware as they crafted the Enlargement doctrine.
Jordan and Israel continue to have normalized relations and enjoy a working, functional
relationship that has shown the ability to grow and change over time. No other Arab nation has
normalized relations with Israel since Jordan, although Jordan’s unique relationship with Israel
prior to the peace treaty, as well as the domestic politics in other Arab nations may have made
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normalized relations unlikely without a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. The
Agreement has fostered Jordanian trade, and deepened Israeli-Jordanian economic ties,
however, Chapter 3 will demonstrate that it has not fostered a middle class. Jordan has,
however, taken steps towards democratization after the Arab Spring, and the USJFTA should be
viewed as one of the sources of stability which enabled the Jordanian government to enact
reforms, unlike neighbors who were unable to do so without violent revolutions.
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Chapter 2: The USJFTA as an Example of A
New American Trade Policy
Introduction
The previous chapter evaluated the United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement as an
instrument of foreign policy. It argued that the USJFTA sought to enhance American interests in
the Middle East, rewarding Jordan after finalizing a peace treaty with Israel. Chapter 1 also
demonstrated how the Agreement fit in to the Clinton Administration’s foreign policy framework
of Enlargement, which sought to combine American foreign and trade policies to enlarge the
global community of market democracies. Enlargement sought to strengthen existing market
democracies and to encourage and support the opening of markets under the belief that open
markets would create a middle class that would, in turn, support democratization. Enlargement
therefore combined many aspects of trade and foreign policy. Bilateral free trade agreements
were a relatively new phenomenon in American foreign policy as the USJFTA was being
negotiated, however. For the first three decades after World War II, the United States
negotiated large multilateral trade deals under the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) framework. This process had widespread bipartisan support from both Congress and
multiple Presidential administrations.
GATT consisted of multiple rounds of tariff reduction negotiations. Initial rounds were limited
largely to industrialized Western nations. Over time, the rounds grew to encompass a greater
number of nations and expanded past industrialized countries into the developing world. This,
when combined with global economic malaise coming out of the 1970s slowed the pace of
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negotiations significantly, and eventually caused the Reagan Administration to begin negotiating
bilateral free trade agreements. The shift towards bilateral FTAs as prospects of continued
global trade deals dimmed marked a phase change in post-War American trade policy. Although
bilateral FTAs enjoyed some bipartisan support in Congress, Democratic presidential candidates
remained opposed to them up through Clinton, who expressed qualified support for NAFTA, an
agreement that was undergoing final negotiations at the time of the 1992 presidential election.
This chapter will examine American trade policy after the Second World War. It will first
evaluate the GATT process, including the issues that delayed the opening of the Uruguay Round,
the issues which prolonged that round of negotiations, and the Clinton Administration’s views on
the GATT (later WTO) process. It will then discuss the shift to bilateral free trade agreements in
US trade priorities, with a special focus on Clinton’s decision to support NAFTA and subsequently
to begin negotiations on new bilateral FTAs. The chapter will argue that Clinton sought to create
a broad, bipartisan basis for bilateral free trade agreements by addressing concerns from key
Democratic constituencies on labor and environmental issues. This chapter will then
demonstrate that a large portion of the debate over the USJFTA was focused on these two
issues. It will then evaluate the specific labor and environmental provisions in the USJFTA and
the impact of these provisions on subsequent American trade deals.

Post-War American Trade Policy and GATT Negotiations
In the decades following World War II, the United States global trade policies were a series of
trade negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The United States
was especially vocal pushing for principles of universalism and non-discrimination (Hufbauer and
Schott, 1998). As such, the United States sought a global marketplace with few or no tariffs. In
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this context, bi- or multilateral FTAs were at best an unwelcome distraction, and at worse, would
encourage other small trade pacts by between other nations which would put the United States
at a competitive disadvantage (ibid).
“The driving force behind the GATT was the same as that which motivated the Bretton Wood
conference in 1944: the interwar disaster,” Irwin (1995) states in his summary of GATT’s history.
The interwar years were marked by increased economic protectionism, and an institutional
framework organized through the League of Nations that did not ultimately foster peace. The
initial plan after the war called for the creation of an International Trade Organization alongside
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund under the auspices of the United Nations. The
creation of this organization was delayed, and by the time that a treaty was ready, Congressional
support for further internationalization had weakened substantially, and in the end an
agreement was never submitted to Congress (Diebold, 1952). GATT formed by taking only the
commercial policy sections of the ITO’s charter, narrowing the force significantly (Irwin, 1995).
This was a conscious effort to create institutions that would foster connections between free
market economies, increasing trade while providing a system of international institutions that
would prevent a third World War, following the Liberal Institutionalist framework (Ikenberry
1992, 1998). The United States consciously encouraged a postwar global institutional framework
that worked in two spheres: The first, truly global institutions such as the United Nations that
included Communist states and were comparatively weak, and the second, relatively stronger
institutions between market economies designed to foster growth and stability in capitalist
nations (Irwin, 1995). GATT was an example of this second, smaller sphere of market economies.
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GATT negotiations made progress “in fits and starts” (ibid), resulting in little progress for 15
years, other than slight improvements in tariff rates and adding new GATT members in the
Annecy (1949) and Torquay (1950-51) rounds (ibid). The next significant change in GATT came
about as a result of the creation of the EEC, once again making trade policy a priority for the
United States (ibid). The Dillon Round (1960-62) resulted in $4.9bn in tariff reductions, but these
were achieved through a laborious item-by-item process. The subsequent Kennedy Round
(1964-67) involved 48 nations resulted in $40 billion in tariff reductions, and became the first
round to include non-tariff issues such as anti-dumping measures and trade and development
for industrializing nations (Endo, 2005). It took a full six years after the conclusion of the
Kennedy round for the Tokyo Round to begin.
The Tokyo Round (1973-79) involved 102 nations, more than double the previous number of
participants and included, for the first time, many developing countries. These negotiations
occurred during a time of “New Protectionism” as global economic growth slowed significantly,
which disproportionately disadvantaged developing countries (Meier, 1981). In the end, the
Tokyo Round agreed upon tariff reductions, but only over a phased 8 to 10 year period, and
while the developing nations did not come away entirely empty handed after taking a seat at the
negotiating table, evaluations of the results of the Tokyo Round for developing countries ranged
from “mixed” to “unsatisfactory” (ibid). This was due in no small part to the new protectionist
orientation of the United States, which (along with a few other developed countries) insisted
that textiles and other goods exported from the developed world be exempted from the round,
relying instead on limited quota numbers (ibid).
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The Uruguay Round involved even more nations and took even longer, a total of 87 months
(Fieleke, 1995). This round lead to the creation of the World Trade Organization. Unlike the
Tokyo Round, the Uruguay Round provided more advantages to the developing world, reducing
the tariffs on finished product exports more than on semi-finished or unfinished goods,
effectively providing net encouragement to developing countries to manufacture products
instead of exporting only commodities (ibid). Though the round ultimately reached a successful
conclusion, the process was described as “stalled” in the popular media during its negotiaton
(UPI 1990, Tumulty, 1991). The lack of progress got to the point that GATT’s own director
general was quoted as saying that delays “would seriously damage the already rocky credibility”
of GATT negotiations (Tumulty 1991). The subsequent Doha Round did not begin until 2001, and
shows no signs of concluding in the near future (BBC 2012).
The successes and failures of the GATT process should be put in perspective. From 1948 through
the end of the Uruguay Round, the GATT process was successful in greatly reducing tariff levels:
in the industrial world they dropped from an average of nearly 40% in the immediate post-World
War II period to roughly 5% (Irwin, 1995). Each round of negotiations was increasingly fraught
and complex. The final Uruguay Round document totaled over 23,000 pages (Fieleke, 1995).
Furthermore, even as overall tariff levels decreased, they were not being harmonized. Each
participant nation agreed to alter its tariffs by a certain amount from its existing levels. While
the trend was generally for nations with greater tariffs to have greater reductions, the trend was
not universal, either between countries or across industries from one country (Fieleke,1995). In
effect, the Uruguay Round could be viewed not as a single trade deal, but instead trade a
separate trade deal from all 123 participating nations with all others. The Uruguay Round also
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explicitly allowed for “plurilateral” agreements – in effect, “sub-agreements” of only a select
group of participant nations (ibid), further adding to GATT’s complexity.

The Slow Shift to Bilateral FTAs
It was in this context that the Reagan Administration began to negotiate bilateral free trade
agreements. Given the complexities and slow progress of the Uruguay Round, the appeal of
bilateral FTAs is understandable: Unlike GATT, they are between only two parties. That makes
them easier to complete. Furthermore, while with GATT forces one nation to take the “prix fixe”
menu of tariffs of another, bilateral FTAs can be tailored towards specific economic needs or
goals. Finally, there was some hope that bilateral free trade agreements might be used to “force
the hand” of reluctant nations and encourage them to finish the Uruguay Round negotiations.
The first bilateral FTA which the United States negotiated was with Israel, an important ally in the
Middle East with a large and active lobby in the United States (Baucus 1989, Rosen 1989). The
FTA was passed off as an opportunity to support a key ally in the region which was in a unique
geopolitical situation due to strained relationships with virtually all of its neighbors and trading
partners. If not quite a “one-off,” the US-Israel FTA was sold as being a way to support an
American ally in a unique situation, rather than the beginning of a shift the priorities of American
trade policy. Interestingly, the US-Israel FTA can be justified by both realist considerations
(strategic interest of supporting Israel), and liberal ones (binding the societies together through
trade).
Three years later, the United States signed a free trade agreement with Canada. The justification
for the FTA with Canada being that for geographic, cultural and political reasons, the Canadian
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and American economies had been closely intertwined for decades, and intra-industry trade and
investment was common and would be further enhanced with further reduction in trade
barriers. The United States and Canada had negotiated a series of pacts in individual industrial
sectors beginning in the 1960s, starting with the Canada-United States Automotive Products
Agreement (the “Auto Pact”). The Auto Pact led to a binational automotive industry centered in
the Detroit area along both sides of the border (Crane, 2015). Canadians, in particular, had
pressed for a more comprehensive agreement covering all trade sectors, and it was Canadian
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney who initially wrote to President Reagan requesting “the broadest
possible package of mutually beneficial reductions in barriers to trade in goods and services”
(McCrath, 1985). Although the negotiations had been fraught – with Canada’s lead negotiator
actually calling the negotiations dead at one point – a deal was struck right as the deadline for
negotiations ended (Hart et al., 1994). Just as the US-Israel FTA was justified due to Israel’s
unique position, the US-Canada FTA was also justified due to unique circumstances. Talks for the
agreement were initiated at Canada’s behest, and the United States is by far Canada’s most
important trading partner. From an American perspective, Reagan was an ardent supporter of
reduced tariffs, giving the agreement some appeal at face value, and negotiating the US-Canada
Agreement might have been intended to provide an impetus for resolving GATT negotiations,
signaling that the United States would precede liberalizing trade outside of the GATT process if
necessary, an “insurance policy” in case GATT did not succeed (Baucus, 1989).
Negotiations on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) began in 1991, which
created further trade liberalizations between the US and Canada and also included Mexico
(Lauterpactht et al., 1999). This time, the new agreement was justified as it would “strengthen a
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neighbor's [Mexico’s] economy” (Feinberg, 2003). The Agreement signed on December 17,
1992, barely a month after the 1992 Presidential election (Lauterpactht et al, 1999), and had
been an issue of political contention throughout the race.

Clinton and NAFTA: Qualified Support for Free Trade
Unlike Republicans, Democrats had been generally ambivalent towards free trade agreements.
While there has always been a section of the caucus that has voted in favor of free trade, others
expressed concerns and voted against agreements. Passage of the US-Canada FTA was largely
uncontroversial, but the debate about adding Mexico to the agreement caused significant
debate in Congress and elsewhere. In 1991 as the agreement was being drafted, Congress voted
to extend "fast-track" authority to then-President Bush for both NAFTA and the Uruguay Round
of GATT negotiations. This obligated Congress to vote on the signed treaty, as written with no
amendments or modifications, and within a specified time period. Fast track was considered
essential completing a ratified treaty, and it is likely that if the authority had not been granted,
the treaty would have been functionally dead in the water (Avery, 1998). A resolution which
would have denied the President fast track was defeated in Congress in 1991, with 91 Democrats
siding with 140 Republicans in the House, and 23 Democrats voting with 36 Republicans in the
Senate (Deveraux et al., 2006), clearing the way for continued talks. Democratic Presidential
candidates, however, had not supported bilateral free trade deals.
This left candidate Clinton with a choice in the 1992 Presidential campaign. He could have
followed the example set by Dukakis in 1988: During that election, Dukakis refused to say
whether he would have signed the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement, instead, making promises
on other trade issues to unions and remaining non-committal on the bilateral FTA (Farnsworth
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1988). He could have opposed the agreement, thereby appealing to unions who were skeptical
of free trade, and who had long been a key source of votes and volunteers for Democrats, or he
could have supported the agreement.
Initially, Bill Clinton vacillated in his support for NAFTA, which allowed President Bush to try and
labeling Clinton as a "protectionist" (Bush, Clinton and Perot, 1992). In the end, Clinton charted
a middle course. About a month before the election, Clinton voiced support for NAFTA so long as
"additional protections" were negotiated "for labor and the environment" (Deveraux et al.,
2006). Clinton was trying to become the first Democrat to win the White House since Carter in
1976, and his candidacy openly tried to expand his party’s base of support to do so. Clinton
successfully cultivated a larger degree of support from business groups than previous Democrats
had in the running for president as part of his “New Democrat” label, but he also had to be
mindful that he could not avoid alienating the traditional power base of unions or the increasing
environmental vote.
Clinton reiterated and clarified his support in the third 1992 Presidential debate, after Ross Perot
famously stated that NAFTA "would create a giant sucking sound of American jobs being pulled
out of the country" (Bush, Clinton and Perot 1992). Clinton argued that the agreement would do
"more good than harm if we can get protection for the environment, so that Mexicans have to
follow their own labor standards, their own labor law standards" (ibid, emphasis added). Those
words and concept would later be significant in the USJFTA, which prescribed that both nations
maintain their old labor laws, instead of creating new standards that were mutually negotiated.
In supporting NAFTA, but with side protections for labor and the environment, Clinton won the
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support of several major environmental groups, no labor groups, and a number of Democrats in
Congress (Devereaux et al, 2006). However, the restrictive nature of the agreement - to
enforcing national labor and environmental laws, instead of to agreed-upon standards for labor
and environmental protections - was a politically necessary move to maintain support for
Republican lawmakers, who opposed any mention of labor or the environment in a free trade
agreement as a matter of principle.
The path he charted - of supporting trade liberalization while being vocal about concerns of labor
groups and the environment - allowed him to win support from key business groups while also
reducing the damage to relations with labor groups (specifically the AFL-CIO, who had spent a
quarter century arguing against trade liberalization) and environmental groups (which had been
more variable in their positions on trade but which voiced concerns about NAFTA) (Destler,
1996).
Clinton's compromise position - of enforcement only of national laws - eased Republican
sovereignty concerns but resulted in labor and environmental side agreements which
"Republicans could live with... because neither of them really had sanctions involved" (Devreaux
et al., 2006). At the same time, Clinton Administration officials convinced Mexican and Canadian
negotiators that such side agreements would be necessary for Clinton to ensure passage of the
NAFTA - generating both internal and external political support for the side agreements at once.
Clinton waited until the labor and environmental agreements were negotiated before pushing
for passage of NAFTA. He was thereby able to secure support from the National Wildlife
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Federation and Environmental Defense Fund, which weakened the impact of other key
environmental groups that remained opposed to the Agreement (Destler, 1996).
Although no labor group voiced support for NAFTA, the labor agreement did inhibit their ability
to mount an effective campaign against the agreement, and provided political cover for
Democrats to vote for the Agreement. In the end, Clinton secured the support necessary to get
his labor and environmental side agreements passed (Yang et al., 1999), in January 1994,
although the vote for the labor agreement was particularly close, at 224 in favor versus 200
opposed (Pomeroy, 1995).
In charting a path to the passage of NAFTA and the promised side agreements, the Clinton
Administration showed early signs of its political adroitness: It created a coalition in support for
NAFTA sufficiently large and broad to ensure passage, even if labor groups, some environmental
groups and some Democrats in Congress may not have liked the level of protection in the
agreement, and even if some Republicans may not have liked to connect free trade, labor and
the environment at all. His statement that NAFTA would do “more good than harm” is telling.
NAFTA may not have been perfect, but in the end, by softening the “sharp edges” of free trade
by adding environmental protections, Clinton believed that free trade agreements were a net
positive.
Clinton’s new administration shepherded NAFTA’s passage at a time when Democrats held
control of both houses in Congress, eventually drawing the support of 102 of his own party along
with 132 Republicans in the House and 27 Democrats and 34 Republicans in the Senate
(Hufbauer, 1993). NAFTA showed that the Clinton Administration’s ability to generate a
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bipartisan coalition around free trade agreements: Sufficiently large numbers of Republicans
could be persuaded to support free trade agreements, even with the labor and environmental
protections necessary to garner enough Democratic support to ensure passage.

The United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement: Clinton’s Take on FTAs
Clinton’s position on NAFTA provided an indication as to his future ambitions regarding free
trade. Bilateral Free Trade Agreements fit in well with Clinton’s “Enlargement” model for foreign
policy, which sought to expand market economies, support trade and thereby encourage the
growth of a middle class, and thereby, democratization. They also were a tool of foreign policy
that the Administration could wield even as Congress sought to decrease spending on foreign aid
outlays after Republicans took control of Congress following the 1994 midterm elections (Tarnoff
and Nowels, 2004). These combined to make FTAs a prime tool of foreign and trade policy for
the Clinton Administration: Although the US-Jordan Free Trade Agreement was the only
agreement that was negotiated and finalized during his time in office, the administration also
began negotiations on a number of others: “if John Foster Dulles had been accused of
“pactomania” for engineering so many security treaties, Clinton was practicing pactomania for
free trade” (Brinkley, 1997).
Clinton supported NAFTA as final text was written and signed in the month before he took office,
without labor or environmental protections, and instead supported inclusion of those provisions
in side agreements. Several observers argued that side agreements do not have the same force
as provisions in the main body of the text (Hinojosa-Ojeda and Robsinon, 1992; Polaski 2003;
Pomeroy 1995; Stern 2003). As his Administration began negotiating a free trade agreement
with Jordan, they moved the labor and environmental protections of the agreement to the main
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body of the text and made them “enforceable” – that is, that options up to and including the use
of border adjustment fees (essentially, renewed tariffs) can be used to ensure that the provisions
are followed (Bolle, 2001).
There is a variation in the expert opinion on how strong the labor and environmental provisions
in the Agreement actually are. Some experts have argued that the inclusion of these provisions
set a new standard for free trade agreements. Some experts believe they will do good, providing
substantial worker protection (Elliot 2003). Others argue they will cause harm: Grynberg (2001)
argues that including labor and environmental provisions could be seen as “environmental and
social dumping” – forcing nations to take the standards from other countries just to secure
preferential tariff treatment. Economists, in particular, are skeptical that labor standards are
best addressed through trade policy (Summers 2001; Brown, Deardorff and Stern 1996;
Srinivasan 1995). There is also the question of if (or how) the measures will be enforced: A
published letter from the then-United States Trade Representative to the Jordanian Ambassador
before the treaty was implemented, he said that governments in the treaty “would not expect or
intend to apply the Agreement’s dispute settlement enforcement procedures in a way that
results in blocking trade.” (U.S. Trade Representative, 2001). Weiss (2003) argues that even if
enforcement procedures were started, the supranational level of the agreement means that
changes on the ground would take effect slowly, if at all. The debate about enforcement
parallels that of the NAFTA labor and environment side agreements, when it was argued that
enforcement of existing laws were often not enforced, and the procedure for a party of the FTA
to ask for enforcement was slow and cumbersome (Pomeroy, 1996). By the standard of the
USJFTA, a party must identify that a country has failed to enforce its laws “in a manner affecting
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trade between the Parties” (US Trade Representative 2001b), which seems to be a substantial
burden of proof. Following that, there is a period of consultation on the issue before any
punitive measures can be pursued.
Clinton left office in January 2001 with the USJFTA finalized, but before it had been debated or
ratified by Congress. When Congressional hearings on the Agreement occurred on March 20,
2001, the labor and environmental protections were a central point of the debate. The Bush
Administration had been notably silent on passage of the Agreement, and did not send a
representative to the debate over its passage (US Senate, 2001) leaving the Senate to bring in a
former Reagan Administration staffer to essentially articulate a Republican position on the
Agreement.
During these hearings, former Clinton aides unsurprisingly testified in support of the agreement,
with former Charlene Barshefsky, US Trade Representative during the Clinton Administration,
arguing that the Agreement was important because it would support trade integration – and
thereby, peace – in the Middle East, a mindset which clearly fits well with Enlargement (ibid),
and would support Jordan’s economic reforms which were a “model for the region” (ibid, 7), and
would serve as a model for future agreements – not because of the trade and environmental
provisions, which Barshefsky downplays as imposing neither “new standards nor bars change or
reform of national laws.” Instead, the agreement is a model because of its inclusion of
intellectual property protections and e-commerce provisions. Sandy Berger, who had served as
National Security Advisor under Clinton, stressed the importance of the Agreement to reward
Jordan because of the Kingdom’s “reconciliation with Israel and for close relations with the
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United States” (ibid, 11), and therefore, for the Middle East peace process as a whole.
Moreover, he argues that support for the Agreement will send “a powerful message to the entire
region” (ibid) that regional economic integration (presumably, including Israel) will provide
tangible benefits to nations that follow Jordan’s example of “global integration, both economic
and strategic” (ibid, 12). Both officials downplayed the trade and labor provisions, undoubtedly
for strategic reasons.
Michael Smith, a Deputy US Trade Representative under the Reagan Administration, on the
other hand, focused his testimony almost entirely on these provisions. He argued that although
he can support “the concept of a free trade agreement between Jordan and the United States,”
(ibid, 9), he takes exception to the labor and environmental provisions of the Agreement, arguing
that there is no consensus that such provisions belong in such agreements (ibid), and that the
wording of the provisions as written in the Agreement are confusing, making it unclear whether
they are truly enforceable, and under what conditions they might be enforced. Either the
provisions aren’t enforceable – in which case, they are “fluff” (ibid, 10), or they are, in which
case they do little to advance labor or environmental causes because of they merely require
each nation to maintain existing legal standards, he argues. The contrast between the two trade
representatives is striking. Smith’s testimony was almost entirely focused on these two
provisions, while Barshefsky mentions the provisions – in passing dismissively, focusing instead
on the importance of the e-commerce and intellectual property provisions, which were also
novel in this agreement.
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During these hearings, there were two testimonies from industry and commerce: Timothy Deal,
from the US Council for International Relations, and Tomas Donohue, from the US Chamber of
Commerce. Deal, and his group, the US Council for International Relations, offer qualified
support for the agreement, on the grounds that it supports the Middle East peace process, that
more bilateral FTAs would generate impetus for greater movement in global trade negotiations
under the WTO. However, he criticizes the labor and environmental provisions, which he
characterizes use trade "as a club to impose US standards on others" (ibid, 12).
Underlying Deal's testimony is a sense that the Jordan trade agreements’ primary importance
was not as a deal in and of itself, but rather, as a signal to other nations. Ratifying the bilateral
FTA pressures other nations to earnestly negotiate global agreements, but the labor and
environmental provisions might discourage other nations – particularly in the developing world –
from negotiating agreements with the US out of fear that these provisions would be forced upon
their countries (ibid, 13). While Deal and the US Council for International Business took a
qualified support of the Agreement (support the passage of the agreement on strategic grounds
while making attempts to "walk back" the labor and environmental provisions), Thomas J
Donohue, then President and Chief Executive of the US Chamber of Commerce instead chose to
"stir up soup" (ibid, 28) and oppose the agreement. Donohue argues – as, in a roundabout way,
Sandy Berger did – that the agreement was put into place for geopolitical, not trade
considerations, given the relatively small volume of trade between the two nations. However,
his testimony makes it clear that he (and the "business community" as he puts it) are adamantly
opposed to the labor and trade provisions in the agreement, which he calls "unrelated" to trade
(ibid). In fact, he goes as far as to state that the strategic arguments for the Agreement merely a
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"subterfuge" for the labor and environmental provisions (ibid). In the end, the Agreement was
ratified by voice vote in both the House and the Senate, indicating widespread support (Bolle,
2001).

The USJFTA’s Effect on Subsequent Free Trade Agreements
The USJFTA was the most concrete example of Clinton’s position on bilateral FTAs. The first
chapter demonstrated how they fit in with the Administration’s foreign policy goals. The
Administration believed that these Agreements could also be good trade policy for the United
States so long as labor and environmental protections were added, preferably in the main body
of the text. The USJFTA was the only agreement whose negotiations began and were concluded
during Clinton’s time in office. Just as Clinton entered in office with NAFTA signed but not
ratified, George W. Bush found himself in a similar position with the USJFTA. Possibly because of
the labor and environment provisions in the Agreement, the Administration was silent during
Senate hearings. In the end, the need for the United States to shore up Middle Eastern partners
following the events of 9/11 helped ensure the Agreement’s passage, labor and environment
provisions included.
The Bush Administration negotiated many bilateral FTAs during its 8 years in office. As the Bush
Administration negotiated these agreements, they faced a decision regarding the labor and
environmental protections introduced in the USJFTA. They could follow the example of the
USJFTA and include enforceable provisions in the main text of the agreement. They could omit
them entirely, or they could take a riff on the NAFTA model and negotiate “side agreements”
alongside the Free Trade Agreement, with or without any specific degree of enforceability. In the
end, the Bush Administration included the labor and environmental protections, using language
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that is virtually identical to that used in the USJFTA. In fact, the last FTA ratified during the Bush
Administration, United States-Peru Free Trade Agreement, actually contains stronger
environmental protection language, including a list of multilateral treaties that each party must
follow, in addition to the earlier promises to follow their own laws and procedures. It could be
argued that this merely makes a stronger parallel to the labor protections, which includes
language to follow and enforce ILO standards as well as local labor laws; however, environmental
treaties often contain more specific language and stringent requirements than the ILO
Declaration mentioned in the labor sections.
Labor and environmental protections were included in later free trade agreements as well.
Three free trade agreements were ratified during Obama’s time in office, though negotiations
for all three were substantially completed during the Bush Administration. These agreements
also include the labor and environmental provisions, although there is additional variation on
some of the specifics. Table 1 lists the free trade agreements that the United States ratified
since the USJFTA. Each includes labor and environmental protections, and variations from the
language introduced in the “Jordan standard” are noted. The Obama Administration did hold
negotiations on a number of FTAs, most notably the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which has not
been ratified, but whose published text does include similar enforceable labor and
environmental provisions to other US-negotiated FTAs since Jordan.
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Table 1: US Free Trade Agreements After USJFTA
Partner

1

Environmental
2
Provisions

Partner Income Level

Australia

2004

High

Yes

Yes

Chile

2004

Upper-middle

Yes

Yes

Singapore

2004

High

Yes

Yes

Bahrain

2006

High

Yes

Yes

Morocco

2006

Lower-middle

Yes

Yes

Oman

2006

Upper-middle

Yes

Yes

3

2007

Lower-middle

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Peru

DR-CAFTA
• Dominican
Republic
Costa Rica

•

El Salvador

•

Guatemala

Lower-middle

•
•

Honduras
Nicaragua

Lower-middle
Low

3

Colombia

3

South Korea
Trans-Pacific Partnership
9
(12 nations)

4

Lower-middle

•

Panama

Labor Provisions

2

Year

2005

Upper-middle
Lower-middle

5

2012

Upper-middle

Yes

2012

Upper-middle

Yes

2012

High

Yes

N/A

Various

5

5,7

Yes

4,6

Yes

4

Yes

4,8

Yes

Yes

Sources: Income Level: World Bank Country and Lending Groups, 2017, Provisions: US Trade
Representative
1

Partner income level from World Bank Country and Income Groups. Data used at year of treaty ratification.
Measured in gross national income per capita In 2015 dollars, breakpoints are: Low-income: $1,025 or less; Lowermiddle-income: $1,026-$4,036; Upper-middle-income: $4,036 and $12,475; High-income: $12,476 or greater.
2
Unless otherwise noted: Labor provisions include “strive to ensure” standards of ILO Declaration (1998), and
“shall not fail to enforce” local laws. Environmental provisions include “shall ensure that its laws provide for high
levels of environmental protection and shall strive to continue to improve those laws,” and “shall not fail to
effectively enforce its environmental laws, through a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction.”
3
Labeled as Trade Promotion Agreement instead of FTA
4
Includes a list of “covered [multilateral] agreements” that a party must implement by adopting, maintaining and
implementing laws and regulations.
5
Enumerates sections of ILO Declaration that each party “shall adopt and maintain in its statutes and regulations.”
6
Amended in 2015 to establish an independent secretariat for environmental enforcement measures.
7
Establishes a Labor Cooperation Mechanism separately and includes published confirmation letters for the public
from each.
8
Includes clarification letter that before seeking dispute resolution, country must determine whether it has laws
that are “substantially in scope” with the other nation on the subject of the dispute.
9
This agreement has not been ratified. The TPP includes labor and environmental provisions with similar
enforceability to the USJFTA, though it also provides for additional cooperation and coordination mechanisms.
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Conclusion
The first chapter argued that Clinton entered office at crossroads in American foreign policy with
the end of the Cold War. This chapter argued that the Clinton Administration entered office at a
crossroads for American trade policy. Clinton’s vision of “Enlargement” merged trade and
foreign policy, seeking to expand American trade and create new market-based economies in a
hope that this would encourage increased democratization. After the end of the Second World
War, the United States was an active leader in the process of creating a new international trade
regime. The goal was to create a system that would avoid the pitfalls and retrenchment of the
interwar years, binding states together through trade, creating a stable world economy and
thereby support a peaceful world, following the Liberal Institutionalist school of thought.
Multiple rounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations substantially
lowered the tariffs in major industrialized nations. Over time, the GATT process expanded –
including more countries, more categories of trade, and non-tariff barriers to trade. These
factors combined to increase the complexity of negotiations and thereby slowed progress on
GATT negotiations. During the 1970s, economic malaise in much of the world further slowed the
negotiations’ pace, and by the 1980s there was a sense that negotiations were stalled and the
credibility of the GATT framework to further lower trade barriers was questioned.
As a result, the Reagan Administration began negotiating bilateral free trade agreements. These
agreements provided an “insurance policy” (Baucus 1989) in case GATT negotiations remained
stalled, they may have also been used as a way of applying pressure to keep nations at the
negotiating table for GATT. At first, these were presented as “one-offs:” The first was with Israel,
viewed as a key US ally in the Middle East. The second was with Canada, and negotiations began
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at the request of the Canadian government. This was justified because of the importance of
trade between the two countries, particularly for the Canadian economy, and because the
United States and Canada had existing trade pacts for specific industrial sectors, such as the
automotive industry. In both cases, interestingly, the Agreements had appeal on both Liberal
and Realist grounds: They created institutions that bound states together through trade, which
Liberals believe decreases the chance of conflict, and they increased the relative power of allies
(particularly with Israel), which appeals to Realists. In addition, negotiating bilateral FTAs has
appeal to Realists because they increase the relative strength of the American negotiating
position on multilateral deals by demonstrating that the United States has alternate means for
achieving its trade goals outside of the multilateral framework.
The Bush Administration negotiated the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which
included Canada and added Mexico. NAFTA negotiations were substantially completed by the
time of the 1992 presidential election in the United States. NAFTA was notable in that it
included a country that had a substantially lower level of industrialization and wages than the
United States, and the potential impact of the agreement on American jobs and workers became
an issue in the campaign. This left candidate (and later, President) Clinton with a choice: Oppose
NAFTA, a policy which would have some benefits, particularly with the Democratic base, support
NAFTA, or offer qualified or conditional support, helping cement the “New Democrat” label that
the Clinton campaign had cultivated. In the end, Clinton took this third option: He supported
NAFTA, but argued that he’d only sign the enabling legislation into law if protections were added
for labor and the environment.
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This created the framework that Clinton would use in trade policy throughout his time in office:
Support free trade, but soften some of the potential negative impacts by including labor and
environmental protections. The one free trade agreement that was negotiated and finalized
during Clinton’s time in office was the United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement. It included
labor and environmental provisions in the main body of the text, protections which were
“enforceable” – that is, essentially, where a failure to comply could have negative financial
consequences. Although the actual level of protections afforded by these provisions has been
debated, their inclusion did constitute the bulk of the controversy during hearings over the
Agreement in Congress.
In the end, the Agreement was ratified, similar enforceable labor and environmental protections
were included in FTAs ratified during both the George W. Bush and Obama Administrations. This
constitutes a legacy of Clinton’s Enlargement vision for foreign and trade policy, using trade to
open up new opportunities for American goods while at the same time expanding the number of
market-based economies. To date, the willingness of increasing numbers of nations to join both
the GATT (and later, WTO) framework, and to negotiate bilateral free trade deals offers evidence
that the Liberal Institutionalist framework provides useful policy prescriptions. The lack of
conflict between nations in the GATT framework, and the fact that free trade deals have
persisted (and no nation has left a bilateral free trade deal with the US) offer evidence that
Liberalism may more accurately predict the actions of nations the post-war period than Realism,
which would predict temporary, shifting alliances as nations seek to maximize their relative
power within the system. The hope of the Liberalism-inspired framework of the USJFTA was that
increased trade would support employment, raise living standards, and lead to the development
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of a broad middle class that would demand an increasing voice in their government and thereby
support democratization. The USJFTA was the first agreement ratified with these protections
baked into the agreement. The economic results of the Agreement – in particular, whether the
USJFTA successfully increased trade, employment, and supported the growth of wages and a
middle class – are evaluated in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3: Economic Effects of the United
States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement
Introduction
Previous chapters have discussed the United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement in the context
of broader American foreign policy both regionally and globally (Chapter 1), and within the
context of shifting American trade policy, focusing on both international and domestic
considerations (Chapter 2). Although FTAs are instruments of foreign policy, they are also
designed to be instruments of economic change. A key premise of the USJFTA was that the
agreement would improve living standards for the average Jordanian, and provide an incentive
for further normalization of relations with Israel. This chapter will evaluate the economic effects
of the US Jordan Free Trade Agreement. The chapter will first provide a general overview of the
Jordanian and American economies. It will then examine the projected economic impact of the
agreements that was offered before the agreement took effect. The chapter will then evaluate
the actual effects of the agreement, first at a macroeconomic level and then in terms of specific
sectors of the economy. The focus will be on those sectors that have been most profoundly
affected by the Agreement, particularly the garment industry, where many of the Agreement’s
effects have manifest themselves. Finally, the chapter will discuss the human effects of the
Agreement by looking at labor issues in the garment industry. Although effects on both the
American and Jordanian economies will be discussed, this chapter will focus more extensively on
the effects in Jordan, where it will be demonstrated that the increased bilateral trade has had a
much more profound impact on the economy.
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Jordan: Economic Overview
Jordan is categorized as an upper-middle income economy, putting it in the same general
grouping as China, Russia or Mexico (World Bank, 2017). Jordan’s economic growth has been
hampered by a lack of natural resources including water and hydrocarbons (CIA World Factbook,
1999). The country’s economic growth is highly dependent upon its neighbors. As oil prices
spiked in the 1970s and through the early 1980s, Jordan benefited from significantly increased
aid from oil-rich Arab states, and annual economic growth averaged in the double digits (see
Figure 1 for Jordanian GDP). Following the stabilization of oil prices, aid and remittances from
Jordanians living in other countries slowed, and Jordan became dependent upon foreign
borrowing to import goods such as oil, food and capital goods (ibid). Economic growth has been
hampered by regional instability, including the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf crisis, the 2003 Americanled invasion of Iraq, and the ongoing civil war in Syria and instability in Iraq, both of which share
land borders with Jordan (EIU Jordan Fact Sheet, 2017). In recent years, real GDP growth has
been relatively low – at an average of 2.6% from the period of 2012 through 2016 (ibid).
The country has made periodic efforts to liberalize its economy starting in the 1980s (CIA World
Factbook, 1999) and accelerating this century (EIU Jordan Fact Sheet, 2017), though significant
structural changes have been slowed because of national and regional political and social unrest.
Economic growth accelerated in the mid-2000s, as the US-Jordan Free Trade Agreement took
effect and as the country benefited from higher aid during a time of increased oil prices. The
country’s dependence on food and energy imports has meant that the country has a significant
structural trade deficit, totaling 9.1% of GDP in 2015 (ibid).
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Figure 1: Jordan GDP, 1975-2016, millions of constant 2010 USD
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Source: World Bank
Jordan’s GDP has grown significantly, but the country has a young population that has also
grown significantly during the same period, greatly affecting the ability of the country to increase
per capita GDP. Examining per capita GDP offers a better insight into the recent economic
history of Jordan. This indicator shows how Jordan was better off in the 1970s and early 80s as
the country benefited from regional oil wealth in the form of increased aid and remittances,
before becoming significantly poorer as oil prices decreased. Growth rebounded in the mid1990s and accelerated in the mid-2000s as regional stability increased and the USJFTA took
effect, before stalling after the 2007-2009 global economic crisis. The mid-2000s were also a
time of high oil prices. In terms of constant 2010 US dollars, per capita GDP approached $3500
in 1988 before receding, and did not approach that figure again until 2004 (see Figure 2).
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Figure 2: Jordan per capita GDP, 1975-2016, constant 2010 USD
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Examining the composition of Jordan’s GDP shows the fragility of the Jordanian economy,
particularly in terms of its reliance on imported goods. From 1997 through 2016, imports have
constantly been above 60% of the Jordanian GDP (imports dipped below this level in 2016,
however, it is unclear whether this is due partly to the challenges of importing goods with so
much turmoil in bordering nations including Syria and Iraq). This leaves the country exposed to
fluctuations in global prices and foreign currency markets, and heavily dependent upon exports,
foreign aid, and borrowing to support the country’s economy.
Exports, meanwhile, grew sharply after the introduction of the US Jordan Free Trade Agreement,
as discussed later in this chapter, from just over 40% of Jordan’s GDP before peaking at 56.5% in
2008, just as a recession was taking hold in many of Jordan’s primary export partners. Exports
declined sharply from a value of $9.19 billion in 2008 to $6.98 billion in 2009 (BACI International
Trade Database). Although exports rebounded in total dollar amounts, reaching $8.12 billion in
2011 and $9.84 billion in 2011 (and have continued to grow in total dollar amounts since) (ibid),
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personal consumption grew significantly faster than exports during this time period as Jordan
welcomed significant numbers of refugees fleeing Syria, and to a lesser extent, instability in Iraq
and increased tension in the Palestinian territories, into its borders.
Throughout this time period, government expenditure as a percent of GDP has remained
relatively stable, slowly decreasing over time, partly as the government receives less aid as a
percentage of GDP from other Arab states. Gross fixed investment, a leading indicator of future
economic growth, has remained mostly stable in the 20-25% range of GDP during the time
period, though it did have a short spike in the period from 2004 through 2008, peaking at 30.6%
of GDP in 2005 as the US Jordan Free Trade Agreement took hold, amongst other changes in the
economy (Economist Intelligence Unit).
Figure 3: Components of Jordanian GDP, 1997-2016
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Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017
Free trade agreements most directly affect the rules regarding exports and imports. Jordan’s
reliance on imports to meet food and energy needs meant that the country has long faced a
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structural trade deficit (CIA World Factbook, 1999), and there was hope that the access provided
to the large US market as part of the USJFTA would reduce this deficit by enhancing Jordan’s
ability to export. Figure 4 shows Jordanian imports and exports over the last two decades.
Although Jordanian exports grew dramatically in the early years of the USJFTA, growth in imports
has continued to outpace growth in exports. In some ways, this is understandable, as the
country’s population has grown, and given its reliance on imports for food, industrial machinery,
and energy, imports are necessary to support a growing economy; however, the growing gap
between exports and imports shows that the agreement has not significantly changed the
structural trade deficit of the Jordanian economy. (It should be noted that the figures below are
not adjusted for inflation or for fluctuations of the value of the Jordanian dinar vs. the USD.)

Figure 4: Jordanian exports and imports, billions of USD, 1997-2016
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Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017
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Jordan’s export composition has had some signficant shifts over the past two decades as the
USJFTA has taken effect. 10 Throughout that period, Jordan’s largest export sector has been in
chemical products, primarily potash and other simple chemical fertilizers. It also exports a
significant quantity of mineral products, primarily calcium phosphates. A fair share of its exports
are also in metal products used in construction, primarily wiring and tubing, though it also
exports some lower-value automobile parts. Although the total value of these exports have
grown over the the past two decades, the overall composition of Jordan’s exports has remained
relatively simliar, except for its growth in textiles. It is evident from the date, and illustrated in
this chapter, that this growth in textiles is a direct result of the USJFTA. Jordan exports textiles
almost exclusively to the United States. Figure 5 shows Jordan’s exports by sector from 19972015.11

10

The international Harmonized System for tariffs makes it possible to examine imports and exports between
countries in a standardized manner. This paper uses the 1992 (HS92) edition of the harmonzied tariff section
asi t was the most widely implemented from the start of this data series, though shifts in definitions between
the various schema wouldn ot greatly affect any of the results. The United States International Trade
Comission (USITC) has copies of each year’s definitions. (USITC, 2017). The BACI International Trade database
makes it possible to apply former Harmonzied Systems (HS) classifications to newer data.
11
Exports are combined by HS chapter into the categories shown in Figure 5 in the following manner:
Fabrics, textiles and footwear: Chapters 50-67
Animal and vegetable products: Chapters 1-15
Foodstuffs: Chapters 16-24
Mineral products: Chapters 25-27
Chemical products: Chapters 28-38.
Plastics, skins, wood and paper: Chapters 40-49
Jewels, stone, glass, metals: 68-81
Tools, wiring, machinery and transportation: 82-89
Others: 90-99
Subsequent figures on Jordanian textiles are limited to chapters 60-63, which focus on fabrics and finished
textile goods, but which exclude fiber products, industrial textiles, ropes, filaments, and footwear, as these
are not the primary focus of Jordanian exports and since chapters 60-63 comprise of what is most often
thought of as “garment and textile industry.”
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Figure 5: Jordanian exports by sector, millions of USD, 1997-2015
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Source: BACI International Trade Database, 2017
As stated in earlier chapters, one of the arguments for the agreement was that it would decrease
Jordan’s chronically high unemployment rate, spur wage growth, and with it, lead to the creation
of a large middle class. The middle class is viewed as important for stability and democratization,
as they have an investment in the country – that is, something to lose economically – making
them less likely to support revolutions or extremism. Over time, the belief is that this class
would organize – through professional associations, trade groups and other community and
voluntary organizations – and these developments would foster democratic change, political
moderation and regional stability. A key premise of the Agreement, however, was that it would
increase the Jordanian standard of living.
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Figure 6 shows the unemployment rate and percent change in real personal disposable income
(defined as total income after taxes and net transfers, meaning it does capture any benefits from
international aid) in Jordan from the years before the creation of the Agreement until 2016
(unemployment data is not available for several years around the time of the US-led invasion of
Iraq, which is contemporaneous to the early stages of the USJFTA’s implementation). Real
personal income shows significant variation throughout the time period, rapidly increasing in
some years (such as 2000 and 2004) while decreasing in others, before stabilizing in the years
after the global financial crisis, at around 3% growth. This figure is decent, if somewhat less than
what might happen during a time of robust economic growth in a lower middle income country.
The unemployment rate was relatively stable throughout the entire time period for the years
when it is available, remaining above 12% throughout the time period and spiking above 14%
only in 2001-2004, and again in 2016. It should be noted, however, that unofficial estimates of
unemployment in Jordan are much higher than official government statistics (Khasawneh and al
Khouri, 2002), though there have been no published attempts to quantify the size of this
discrepancy.
Figure 6: Personal consumption and unemployment in Jordan, 1997-2016
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Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017
Taken together, these figures might suggest that the USJFTA had little to no effect on Jordan’s
economy, however, as stated earlier, the country had been greatly affected by larger events
within the region, including the invasion and subsequent overthrow of the Ba’athist regime in
Iraq, the Arab Spring, and the civil war in Syria. This was also a time when the global economy
was greatly affected by the 2007-2009 financial crisis and its aftermath. The civil war in Syria
particularly had an impact on Jordan as the country began to receive a large number of
refugees, swelling the country’s population significantly. This trend augmented the large
natural growth of the Jordanian population stemming in part from its youthful demographic
profile. Figure 7 shows Jordan’s total population from 1997 through 2016 alongside the annual
percent change in population over that time period.

Figure 7: Jordanian population (left axis) and % change YoY (right axis), 1997-2016
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Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017
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Examining Jordan’s population growth shows the nation’s unemployment rate in a different light.
Jordan’s 3.6% increase in the unemployment rate from 2014-2016, for example, occurred at a
time when the country’s population increased by over one million inhabitants, nearly averaging a
double-digit annual population increase. In light of Jordan’s population growth, the country’s
ability to maintain a relatively stable unemployment rate is remarkable, and paints a favorable
contrast of the Jordanian economy compared to others in the Arab world, where young, rapidly
growing populations have led to significant increases in the unemployment rate. In diagnosing
causes of the Arab Spring, and the associated (and often subsequent) violence and unrest, “too
many young idle hands” is often cited as a significant, if not the primary, contributing factor (e.g.
The Economist, 2013).

United States: Economic Overview
The United States is a high-income economy (World Bank 2017) with a broad base of service and
manufacturing. The United States has the world’s largest GDP, at $18.6 trillion in 2016, or
$57,321 per capita, among the highest in the world for industrialized nations. An overheated
housing market combined with increased financialization and decreased oversight of that sector
of the economy triggered a domestic financial crisis and a global recession from 2007-2009.
Economic recovery and a slow expansion continued for eight years since that time period, but
growth rates remain low and recovery in the workforce, particularly wages and the employmentto-population ratio remain low compared to other post-war recoveries. Real GDP growth in the
U.S. averaged 1.6% in the period from 2012-2016 (EIU United States Fact Sheet, 2017).
The United States has had a persistent trade deficit for decades, due in part to the United States
dollar’s position as the global reserve currency and the perceived safety of American
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government bonds. The total current account deficit of the United States reached a total to
2.6% of GDP in 2015 (ibid).
Figure 8 shows the components of the United States’ GDP over the past two decades. As might
be expected for a developed country with a highly diverse economic base, the components
remained relatively stable throughout the time period. Private consumption remains the driver
of the American economy, and has slowly risen over time from 64.6% of GDP in 1997 to 68.7% in
2016. Government consumption has also remained relatively stable, between 17.7% of GDP in
2016 (and 17.8% in 2015 and 2000), peaking at 21.4% in 2009 as stimulus spending peaked
following the recession that began in 2007. Investment peaked in 2000, as the economy grew
rapidly as a result of the so called “dot-com” boom that saw significant productivity growth at a
time when the Baby Boomer generation born after World War II hit their prime earning years.
Investment from all sources remained at around 18% of the economy until the recession, when
it fell to 14% in 2009 and 13.6% in 2010 before rising again to around 16% of the economy in
recent years.
Exports have hovered around 10-12% of the US economy, briefly going as low as 9% in 2006 and
increasing to as much as 13.7% of the economy in 2014. Imports have similarly hovered in a
narrow range, between 12.3% of American GDP in 1997 and 1998 to as high as 17.3% of GDP in
2011. This increase can be explained largely due to high oil prices at a time when the US
economy was returning to growth following the recession. Imports of petroleum products
accounted for a total of 21% of all the value of total US imports in 2011, compared to 7.7% in
2015 (BACI International Trade Database). Since that time period, higher US production of
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petroleum products and lower global prices for oil has combined to decrease the total cost of
imports as a percentage of the American GDP. This has had the effect of reducing the American
trade deficit, however, that decrease has been partly offset by an increase in imports in other
sectors.
Figure 8: Components of United States GDP, 1997-2016
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Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017
The United States, with a population of 324 million, is a nation on an entirely different scale than
Jordan, whose population remains under 10 million (Economist Intelligence Unit). Adding to
that, the United States is a significantly wealthier nation than Jordan. The sheer scale
differences between the economies of the two countries means that the economic impact of the
agreement on the United States is negligible, although later in this chapter the effects on specific
sectors of the economies of both nations will be considered. To illustrate the size difference,
Figure 9 shows American imports and exports, which together remained less than one-third of
the US economy during this period, compared to the entire GDP of Jordan. Throughout this time
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period, American imports and exports ranged from 277 times Jordan’s total GDP in 1997 (with
American exports totaling $954 billion and imports totaling $1,056 billion compared to Jordan’s
$7.2 billion GDP) to 128 times in 2016 (as the US economy exported $2.2 trillion of goods and
services, imported $2.7 trillion, and Jordan’s GDP was equal to $38.7 billion) (Economist
Intelligence Unit).
Figure 9: US imports and exports vs. Jordan GDP, billions of USD, 1997-2016
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Estimated Economic Effects of the US Jordan Free Trade Agreement
Given the difference in scales between the American and Jordanian economies, most estimates
of the Agreement’s effects focused on achieving policy goals in the United States (e.g., including
provisions on the environment or intellectual property that would serve as a model for future
agreements, demonstrating continued American support for free trade), and the economic,
social and political effects in Jordan. Even the likely effects on Jordan, however, were barely
studied in the time leading up to ratification of the Agreement. Formal estimates of any kind
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were only produced by researchers working under government or government-supported
institutions in the US and Jordan.
The sole published study originating from Jordan around the time of the Agreement’s ratification
predicted impacts on Jordanian manufacturing, including the possibility of diversification into
high tech manufacturing, a relatively new industry for Jordan and one that provides the
possibility of higher profit margins than most of Jordan’s exports (Khasawneh and al Khouri,
2002). The report also estimated– but did not quantify - an increase in foreign direct investment
in Jordan as a result of the agreement. Furthermore, the report also predicted that the
preexisting Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ) which began operation in 1998, would continue
under the Agreement, due to slightly different requirements of national origin and value
between the QIZ (which also have Israeli and/or Palestinian inputs) and the USJFTA.
Two studies on the potential effects of the Agreement were undertaken by researchers
supported by the United States government under the auspices of the US International Trade
Commission (USITC). The first was a formal estimate published at the request of the United
States Trade Representative. The second study is a working paper by an individual author
comparing the US Jordan Free Trade Agreement’s impacts on Jordan to NAFTA’s effects on
Mexico, published shortly after the agreement was ratified.
US International Trade Commission’s formal study states that the USJFTA is “not expected to
have a measurable impact” on US export sectors (US International Trade commission, 2000, viii)
and that “an FTA with Jordan is not expected to have a measurable impact on US imports,” on all
except one of the sectors which the Commission evaluated due to the size differences between
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the two countries. The USITC’s study selected sectors based upon the two countries existing
trade with each other and with other nations (ibid). The study evaluates impact on trade in
these selected sectors, illustrating why the USJFTA would have a limited impact, even when
allowing for the size differences between the two nations.
Jordan’s major exports would either have a difficulty reaching the US market effectively (e.g.
citrus fruits and vegetables which would have to travel past potential markets in the Middle East
and Europe to reach US consumers (ibid, 5-4, 5-8), or are in industries where the tariffs are low
and other potential trade barriers are high. For example, Jordan is a significant exporter of
fertilizers, however, transportation costs are high for such products, the United States is already
a significant exporter, and tariffs on fertilizer imports from Jordan were already free of duty
before the agreement was signed (ibid, 5-3). Similarly, Jordan’s second largest export to the US
prior to the USJFTA was jewelry, but jewelry imports to the US from Jordan were already 0%
under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program designed to stimulate economic
growth in poorer countries (ibid, 5-4).
The study also found that Agreement was also unlikely to have a significant impact on US exports
to Jordan for a variety of reasons. For example, the United States is a major global wheat
exporter, and Jordan required grain imports to feed its population; the US was Jordan’s primary
source for wheat in 1999. However, as Jordan did not tax wheat imports, the USJFTA would have
no impact on the terms of trade between the two countries (ibid, 5-9). In other sectors, the
impacts would have been negligible as a percent of total US exports, the reduction in tariffs was
unlikely to encourage domestically-inclined American industries to begin exporting (ibid). Given
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the size difference between the two economies, even drastic increases in American exports to
Jordan are lost in the overall size of American industries. The report estimated that electric
machinery exports to Jordan might double as a result of the Agreement, to a total value of $43
million, compared to total US exports of $94.2 billion in the sector.
The second study (Chomo 2002) compared the effects of the two “North-South” FTAs with
developing countries that the United States had signed to that point, NAFTA (with Mexico) and
the USJFTA. It predicts that the Jordanian economy was poised to gain relatively more than the
US economy as a result of the free trade agreement, largely because Jordan’s relatively high
tariffs created a distortionary effect on the Jordanian economy (Chomo, 3). Using the HecksherOhlin model for international trade, her study suggests that Jordanian cereal production would
likely decrease and imports from the United States increase as a result of the agreement (ibid,
6). The study also finds that light manufactures products, “specifically textiles, apparel, and
pharmaceuticals” would increase as “these products are produced with an input mix
representing the relatively abundant labor compared with scarce capital in Jordan” (ibid, 7). A
significant fraction of that gain would be in apparel, which faced a relatively high tariff rate of
between 8-10% in the United States (ibid, 16). Unlike the formal USITC study, Chomo cites
Israel’s exports of off-season tomatoes to the United States, using its combination of a warm
climate and favorable tariff treatment under the FTA, as evidence that Jordan might use its
existing vegetable export sector to begin supplying high-value crops (specifically vegetables and
tomatoes) to the US during off-season months (ibid, 9-10).
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Chomo demonstrates that the (pre-NAFTA) Mexican and Jordanian economies shared a great
number of similarities, despite Mexico’s significantly higher per capita GDP. This commonality is
used as the basis for predicting the effects of the USJFTA on Jordan. However, the study did
note that Jordan faced higher average tariff rate than Mexico before the FTAs were signed, and
that welfare gains from FTAs in both cases are difficult to measure due to the lengthy phase-in
period of FTAs and diffuse nature of such gains (ibid, 14-15). Mexico also enjoyed several
advantages that Jordan did not, such as a shared border, strong transport links, the possibility of
manufacturing colocation between Mexico and the United States, and significant inward foreign
direct investment (FDI). Chomo argues that “the key for Jordan is to attract investment funds.
The Middle East suffers from lower than world-average foreign direct investment” (ibid, 23).
Between these three studies, a few common predictions emerge. First, there was recognition
that the low amounts of foreign direct investment into Jordan present a barrier to further
economic growth. Second, this led, in turn, to a belief that inward FDI could increase after the
ratification of the USJFTA, especially considering the country’s economic reforms in the 1990s,
which included a bilateral investment treaty with the United States and joining the WTO. This
belief, however, was less than certain and remained unquantified in all the published analysis.
Third, on more concrete grounds, studies showed that the USJFTA would have a negligible
impact, at most, on American production (either for domestic consumption or for exports).
Fourth, the impact on Jordan was predicted to be more profound. The basis for this prediction
was two-fold. First, the reduction in tariffs was expected to complement the existing QIZ, due to
differences in their regulations, particularly with regards to foreign origin. Second, the
agreement was predicted to make existing Jordanian industries, particularly textiles, much more
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competitive, given the relatively high rate of tariffs before the passage of the Agreement.
Finally, two analyses raised the possibility that favorable tariff treatment could open a new
export market for Jordanian goods with a relatively high weight-to-value ratio: electronics,
particularly digital electronics (Khasawneh and al Khouri, 2002) or high-value agricultural
products like flowers or fruit (Chomo).

Bilateral Trade Between Jordan and the United States
The USJFTA was ratified by the United States in late 2001 and came into force in stages shortly
thereafter. American tariffs on Jordanian goods were eliminated almost immediately, while
Jordanian tariffs on American goods were to be eliminated in stages depending on the pre-FTA
rate, with several sectors particularly important to government revenues, like alcohol or
automobiles, exempted from the agreement entirely (Khasawneh and al Khouri, 2002). Given
the miniscule impacts of the Agreement on the American economy, however, means that the
effects of the USJFTA can be examined from a 2002 starting date. Some of the effects of the
Agreement rapidly took hold, while others had delayed effects of several years, which is
understandable as companies built explored new market opportunities, attracted investment,
built factories, and began producing goods.
The Agreement had a profound effect on the size and composition of Jordanian trade. Figure 10
shows Jordanian trade with the United States (with Jordan as the country of origin – exports are
to the United States, and imports are from the United States) from 1997 through 2015. Exports
to the United States were miniscule until 2000, when products began to flow from Jordanian QIZ
to the United States. From that level, they rose quickly, increasing from $112 million in 2000 to
$420 million a year later (again, this is before the Agreement was ratified, so this figure is a result
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of the QIZ program, not the FTA), before more than doubling to $910 million in 2003 and
reaching $1.6 billion in 2005. After 2005, exports essentially plateaued, before lowering
significantly during the 2007 recession. Jordanian exports to the US reached a new peak in 2015,
finally eclipsing the pre-recession figure seen in 2005. The country also moved from a net
importer from the United States to being a net exporter through most of the time period. The
trade surplus with the US was highest during the pre-recession years, before moving to a rough
trade balance as Jordanian exports plummeted. Though not definitive, it appears that the recent
increase in Jordanian exports may be creating another trade surplus with the United States for
some time to come.
Figure 10: Jordan exports to and imports from United States, millions of USD, 1997-2015 12
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Given the surge in Jordanian exports to the United States, it is unsurprising that the country
became a much more important trading partner to Jordan during this time period. Figure 11

12

Note: At the time of writing, bilateral trade data is only available through 2015, not 2016 as with earlier figures
in this chapter.

96

shows the share of exports going to Jordan’s largest export partners from 1997-2015. Exports to
the United States accounted for only 2.2% of Jordan’s total exports in 1997 – in fact, placing the
United States in 12th place among Jordanian export partners, behind other Middle Eastern
nations, but also behind Japan (2.5%) and the Netherlands (3.5%), and scarcely ahead of Italy
(2.1%) and Italy (2.0%) (BACI International Trade Database, 2017). By 2001, however, the
United States was Jordan’s second-largest export partner, and in the years before the recession,
it was Jordan’s largest export market by a significant margin, before shrinking in importance
during the recession and its aftermath. Since the USJFTA has been signed, the United States has
been Jordan’s largest trading partner by a wide margin, even when including much closer trading
partners such as Saudi Arabia, which largely imports pharmaceutical products, agricultural
products and some construction equipment (especially wiring and tubing) from Jordan, and
India, whose almost exclusive Jordanian import is fertilizers.
Figure 11: Jordianian exports to major export partners, percent of total, 1997-2015
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The Free Trade Agreement did not simply open a new market for existing Jordanian export
industries. Jordan had previously exported some textiles to the United States, valued at just
under $5 million in 1997, before they qualified for favorable tariff treatment by virtue being
produced in a qualified industrial zone (QIZ, from 1998 onwards) or under the FTA. Chomo
(2002) predicted that this trade could expand because textiles require relatively few capital
inputs and relatively high labor inputs; however, the sheer magnitude of this expansion is
remarkable.
Textiles comprise the vast majority of the total value of exports to the United States (Figure 12).
In fact, the only other export of any significance is jewelry (which began to be exported in
quantity in 2005 – visible in the spike of the red line of the figure below). The value of jewelry
exports peaked at $119 million in 2005, and has not reached that level since (BACI International
Trade Database). Jordan’s exports to the United States are almost entirely in textiles.
Pharmaceuticals, a few high-value edible products, and others are exported in small quantities to
the United States, but in a total amount that is smaller than over textiles comprise over 90% of
the total value of Jordanian exports to the United States since 2002, the first year after the
USJFTA was ratified. It should be noted that despite their importance to Jordanian-US trade,
total US textile imports of all kinds were valued at $118 billion in 2015, of which Jordan’s share
was only $1.57 billion, or 1.3% of the total. This confirms the USITC’s conclusion that the USJFTA
was unlikely to affect US producers or even have a significant impact on other US trading
partners. Even as Jordan’s textile trade with the US skyrocketed, the net value compared to total
imports in that sector remained miniscule.
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Figure 12: Jordan exports to the US: textiles vs. all other, millions of USD, 1997-2015
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Source: BACI International Trade Database, 2017
Textiles have a series of properties that make them a good market for export: First, they are
relatively lightweight for value (one of the reasons that textiles were amongst the first globally
traded commodities, as far back as the Silk Road and the European trade for Indian textiles in the
early modern era). Second, textile production is relatively capital and skill un-intensive (Chomo,
Safa), and the inputs are also light-weight and easy to transport. Jordan’s economic profile, with
a relatively low capital stock and relatively low wages, was therefore suited to be a textile
exporter to the US once the relatively high tariffs on those goods were removed as part of the
FTA process (Chomo).
Jordan’s textile exports were worth only $42 million in 1997, but only seven years later, were
over $1.3 billion, and by 2015 were worth over $1.8 billion. Textile exports to the United States
increased over 46,100% from 1997 to 2015, at a time when total American textile imports from
all countries roughly doubled, from $58 billion in 1997 to $118 billion in 2015 (BACI International
Trade Database). This growth, however, was not due to superior quality of Jordanian textiles nor
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because Jordan developed a comparative advantage of production over other textile exporting
nations. If that had been the case, then Jordan would be expected to become a large global
exporter of textiles, sending goods to many countries, particularly wealthy, textile-importing
regions like Europe, Japan or the rest of North America.
This, however, was not the case. Jordan’s textile industry is almost entirely dependent upon
access to the American market – access which is now tariff-advantaged compared to other major
textile exporting countries in South and East Asia. Figure 13 shows Jordan’s textile exports to the
US versus the rest of the world. As the graph clearly illustrates, Jordan’s textile industry lives and
dies by access to the US market. Even as American textile imports declined significantly in the
recession, creating spare capacity in the industry, Jordanian exports to other countries remained
relatively constant.
Overall, this suggests that Jordan enjoys no real advantages to textile production. The country
has higher labor costs than nations in South Asia, and its location and transport links are
relatively undeveloped, with only a single international seaport (located on the Red Sea), though
it does have access by road to Israel and neighboring nations. In other words, the textile
industry exists almost solely because of Jordan’s custom-advantaged access to the American
market: The textile industry was only a small part of Jordan’s pre-QIZ and FTA relationship with
the United States, and even after the industry developed; it has struggled to find export markets
outside of the US.
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Figure 13: Jordianian textile exports, US vs. rest of world, millions of USD, 1997-2015
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Source: BACI International Trade Database, 2017
Because of the relatively low skill level required of garment workers and the low capital
requirements of the textile industry, it is often one of the first industries to develop during
industrialization. A frequently-cited plan for industrialization is for a country to begin exporting
whatever products it can, at whatever price it can, to earn foreign currency and to encourage
foreign direct investment (Chomo; Khasawneh and al Khouri). Over time, this investment
increases the capital stock of a country, and when combined with increasingly an educated and
skilled workforce, allows the country to begin producing products of increasingly high value,
further stimulating increased investment, exports, and thereby supporting a rising standard of
living. Both Chomo and Kasawneh and al Khouri cited either a need (Chomo) or a hope
(Kasawneh and al Khouri) for increased foreign direct investment as a result of the USJFTA.
Figure 14 shows total net inward foreign direct investment to Jordan from 1997 through 2015.
Foreign direct investment into Jordan did spike significantly in the years after the Free Trade
Agreement was signed with the United States. Inward FDI spiked significantly in the year that
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the agreement was signed, and continued to increase significantly in the years following. Even
though the level decreased significantly during and after the recession, the levels of inward FDI
remain significantly above the pre-FTA figure.
Figure 14: Total net inward FDI to Jordan, millions of USD, 1997-2015
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Source: World Bank Development Indicators, 2017
Neither Jordanian government sources nor global economics databases publish source countries
of FDI inflows on a regular basis, nor do they break down FDI inflows by sector. 13 This makes it
difficult to determine what industries the investments are targetting. They could, in theory, be
used to support industries geared towards the local market, though frequently foreign investors
seek to create products for export.

13

The United Nation’s UNCTAD FDI/TNC database did report sources of inward FDI for Jordan from some countries
from 2001-2012; however, the reporting was done on a seemingly voluntary basis for sources of the investment
and they never equaled more than roughly 20% of total FDI flows for any given year, and no nation consistently
reported data for every year during the period.
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Looking at the year-by-year change of Jordanian exports by sector shows that although most
sectors experienced significant growth from 1997-2015, the Jordanian textile industry is the only
one that expanded significantly as a share of total exports – from roughly 5% to more than 20%
of Jordan’s total exports (BACI International Trade Database). This suggests that inward FDI is a
significant driver in the growth of the textile industry. For lack of more definitive data, one
possible way to examine the relationship between the growth in foreign direct investment over
the previous year and the growth in textile exports over the following year. Figure 15 shows the
relationship.
Figure 15: Inward FDI vs. textile exports, YOY change (%), 1998-2015
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Source: World Bank Development Indicators, 2017 (FDI inflows), BACI International Trade
Database (textile exports)
The data are highly correlated. In years when FDI increased, textile exports similarly spiked the
following year. Examining the peak in Figure 15 illustrates this relationship. In 2000, Jordan saw
a massive influx of foreign direct investment, rising from $158 million to over $913 million. The
following year, Jordanian textile exports spiked from $80 million to $372 million. In the years
before and since, the relationship remains extremely highly correlated (p-value is .86 over the
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time series). As the USJFTA was being finalized, inward FDI to Jordan spiked, and shortly after it
was ratified, textile exports, either under the Agreement or the QIZ program, also increased
rapidly, with the QIZ program acting to “jump-start” investment in textile manufacturing in
Jordan in advance of the USJFTA (Williams).
In subsequent years, even though the total levels of foreign investment increased and as
Jordan’s textile industry continued to expand (except around the time of the recession), the rate
of change slowed dramatically. This suggests that foreign investment in to Jordan has largely
supported growth in the textile industry. On one hand, any growth in investment is, almost by
definition, beneficial to Jordan, especially considering that the Middle East, in general, has
suffered from lower levels of FDI than comparable economies in other regions (Chomo). On the
other hand, the fact that investment would appear to be so highly concentrated in the textile
industry (again, a “starter” export for industrializing nations) suggests that the influx of
investment has not done a great deal to encourage overall development of the Jordanian
economy.

Human Effects of Trade
One of the issues facing Jordan has been chronically high unemployment, with official figures in
the double digits, and unofficial estimates suggesting the true figure may be much higher (see
“Jordan Economic Overview” earlier in this chapter). The textile industry, whatever its
downsides may be for economic growth, is, at least, labor intensive, suggesting that it might be
beneficial for the unemployment rate in Jordan. The net effect of the explosion in Jordan’s
textile industry has, in fact, created a great number of jobs in Jordan; however, these jobs have
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not been filled by Jordanians. This trend has created one of the more surprising and (by most
analyses) unexpected effects of the USJFTA.
In negotiating the QIZ program, there was an understanding that using foreign workers might
reduce labor costs, and as a result, the program limited foreign work forces within the QIZ to
35% of the total labor force (Khasawneh and al Khouri, 2002). The free trade agreement,
however, has no such provision, and instead, simply requires both nations to follow their local
labor laws (ibid). The result has been that as of 2012, a full 75% Jordan’s 55,000 textile workers
come from South Asian countries such as Bangladesh or Sri Lanka many of whom have existing
apparel industry experience from employment in their home countries (Williams, 2015).
Employing foreign labor has a number of advantages over domestic Jordanian workers. Foreign
labor is cheaper. Moreover, turnover amongst Jordanian workers is high, as the 90% female
workforce often leaves work once they get married (Williams). In addition to expecting higher
wages, Jordanians also expect additional job benefits, such as transportation to and from factory
sites (Khasawneh and al Khouri, 2002). For female workers who have children, Jordanian law
requires that daycare be provided if there are more than 20 female employees and a total of at
least 10 children between them (Obeidat, 2015). In addition to costs and retention, there is the
simple problem of recruitment. Out of 19,657 open jobs in Jordan’s textile industry between
2011 and 2013, only 4,251 people applied (ibid). This may be due as much to cultural as
practical considerations: Families may be reluctant to let young women work far away from the
home (ibid), and the work may be viewed as low status (Khasawneh and al Khouri, 2002). This is
one reason why the QIZ program, while still existent, has a limited impact of the garment
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industry: In 2012, only $63.1 million out of nearly $1 billion in textile imports from Jordan came
from QIZs (Textile World Asia, 2012).
The garment industry in Jordan has also extracted a heavy toll on workers, particularly in the first
decade after the QIZ program began. American NGOs operating in Jordan described a pattern of
widespread human rights abuses, ranging from low wages (sometimes below Jordan’s minimum
wage), long hours (including forced/mandatory overtime), poor working and living conditions in
on-site dormitories, to patterns of physical and sexual abuse of female migrant workers who
were essentially trapped on factory sites and who had their passports confiscated (Gillespie,
2006). The QIZ program, and later, the FTA, created a large migrant labor force in Jordan that is
overwhelmingly female. The use of female migrant labor is significant, because many have
argued that it is easier to abuse. The garment industry in particular has been said to seek “the
cheapest and most malleable labor: predominantly female, low-skilled, and disempowered” (Ho,
Powell and Volpp, 1996:386). A female workforce “can be paid less than men, they were usually
docile and less likely to join unions” (Reynolds, 2000:443). Female workers are both easier to
abuse and less likely to report abuses (Carling, 2005). Reports of a total of 140 hours of work per
week (an unbelievable 20 hours a day, 7 days a week) including forced overtime have been filed,
and not disputed by official Jordanian government inspectors (Jordan Ministry of Labor 2006).
The limits of the United States Free Trade Agreement’s protections on labor protection come
into focus in this case. It recognizes that each country has “the right… to establish its own
domestic labor standards, and adopt or modify its labor standards and regulations” (United
States Jordan Free Trade Agreement – Final Text Article 6), and only asks that each government
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will “strive to ensure” that their legal framework is consistent with “internationally recognized
labor rights,” which is generally taken to mean ILO treaties. Each country is committed to
remaining an ILO member, though the ILO and any specific treaty is not mentioned specifically.
Moreover, the treaty is extremely flexible on this matter, noting that both countries must only
“strive” to ensure minimum standards and not actually write such standards into law (ibid). The
enforceable “shall” labor provision (“shall” being a term of requirement, unlike “strive”) – that is,
the provision which can trigger trade retaliation including the reintroduction of tariffs – is highly
limited. The Agreement only requires that each government “shall not fail to effectively enforce
its labor laws…in a manner affecting trade between the Parties” (ibid).
This means that Jordan is free to have relatively weak labor laws. Even if they fall short of
international standards, as long as they “strive” to meet those standards, they are not in
violation. Moreover, if Jordan fails to meet the standards of their own laws, enforcement can
only be triggered if the United States could demonstrate that trade is affected – for example, if
American producers of textiles (of which there are few, concentrated mostly in higher-end
products which Jordan does not export) – were negatively affected. In fact, it wasn’t expected
that these provisions would ever require the threat of retaliation. A published letter from the
then-United States Trade Representative to the Jordanian Ambassador before the treaty was
implemented stated that the governments in the treaty “would not expect or intend to apply the
Agreement’s dispute settlement enforcement procedures in a way that results in blocking trade”
(US Trade Representative, 2001a).
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Whether the Jordanian government is turning a blind eye to the issues of migrant labor is a
matter of debate and perspective. The Jordan’s relatively weak labor laws (International Labor
Organization) have certainly not helped matters. After the American NGO National Labor
Committee (NLC) reported widespread violations (Gillespie, 2006), the Jordanian Ministry of
Labor (MoL) investigated claims and issued a subsequent report (Jordan Ministry of Labor, 2006).
The report acknowledges some issues, and the government states that in the prior year the
Ministry issued 3000 penalties to factories operating in QIZ. At the same time, the report lays
out claims from the NLC compared to findings from Jordanian Ministry of Labor Inspections in a
table, and at times, the MoL findings seem, at best, hopelessly naïve, at times defensive, and at
others, absurd. Where the NLC found that “work is for seven days a week,” the MoL concluded
that it was “not always and not all workers do overtime work” (ibid). Where the NLC found that
workers at one factory required permission to go to the toilet, the MoL responded that there
was “nothing to prove this.” The MoL also noted that allegations of trafficking of workers “could
not be verified.” Where the NLC found that one factory paid less than the minimal wage, the
MoL concluded that company records showed that minimum wage laws were being followed.
The report itself did acknowledge weaknesses in the MoL’s ability to monitor and enforce laws
and regulations, but it also detailed a number of concrete changes that the country had
undertaken, including taking “lessons learned” from International Labor Organization work in
Cambodia to improve conditions in its garment industry.
Reports from years after the initial claims by the NLC did detail a number of improvements in
working conditions (Williams, 2015), and since 2008, the Jordanian government has mandated
that all garment exporters participate with an independent group known as Better Work Jordan,
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a partnership of the International Labor Organization and the World Bank’s International Finance
Corporation. The group carries out independent inspections on an annual basis and creates
recommendation for improvements (Williams 2015; Textile World Asia). In 2013, Jordan’s
General Trade Union of Workers in Textile Garment and Clothing Industries reached an
agreement with industry associations recognizing the union and affirming a number of workers’
rights (IndustriAll Global Union). Since that time, pay and working conditions have improved
significantly (Williams, 2015).

Conclusion
It is possible to conclude that the United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement has been a
runaway success, if measured by Jordanian exports to the United States, which exploded from a
level of tens of millions of dollars a year to nearly $2 billion in 2015. It is also possible to
conclude that the Agreement has been a failure, since it has not achieved many of the expected
gains. The country, for example, has maintained a large current account deficit, has had
persistently high unemployment, and per-capita GDP in Jordan has not changed significantly
since the Agreement was signed. Over 90% of Jordan’s exports to the United States are in
textiles and apparel, and 75% of the workers in those industries are imported migrant labor.
Hence, the expected growth of an indigenous middle class through an open trade regime has not
come to fruition.
It may be most accurate to describe the Agreement as a qualified success. Jordan’s economy
has faced a number of external shocks in the time since the USJFTA was ratified, from significant
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and prolonged instability on the part of its neighbors (including, in particular, Iraq and Syria,
which have been major trading partners of Jordan), to a global financial crisis. The limits of this
success are significant, however. An initial hope was for the Agreement to support new middleclass jobs and employment, for the country to “move up the food chain” of production. To date,
exports to the US have been limited to almost solely to textiles, where wages are low, most
workers are not Jordanian, and the relatively small share of Jordanian workers is limited to
women before they marry – that is to say, not the kind of employment that supports a
prosperous middle class.
The Jordanian textile industry is also, in some ways, in a precarious position in that it depends
not only on privileged access to the American market, but also that other textile-exporting
countries with lower labor costs (including many of the home countries for the migrant laborers
in Jordan’s garment factories) do not have this access. The industry operates on narrow
margins: When Jordanian textiles faced tariffs of roughly 10% upon entry to the United States,
there was virtually no Jordanian textile industry. That is the margin of Jordan’s advantage in the
sector. This is demonstrated, in part, by the fact that Jordan exports almost no textiles to the
European Union, despite the free trade agreement between Jordan and the EU (European
Communities-Jordan Euro-Mediterranean Agreement). Unlike the United States, the EU has
signed a great number of trade deals, and has other trade programs that encourage
development. Significant amongst these is the EU’s “Everything But Arms” program, which
removes almost all tariffs from least developed countries (except on armaments) (European
Commission). European imports of textiles largely come from countries – including major textile
exporters Bangladesh and Cambodia (BACI International Trade Database) – because they have
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lower labor costs than Jordan and receive the same favored tariff treatment. (It should be noted
that Jordan now has access to this program while the country hosts Syrian refugees, so long as
the industries workforce is composed of at least 15-25% Syrian refugees (European Commission,
2017).) This gives Jordan limited headroom to improve worker wages or conditions, and make
garment-industry jobs more attractive to Jordanian workers. It also highlights the limited profit
potential for the industry, where margins are low and competition is global.
The United States Jordan Free Trade Agreement has been in force for just over a decade and a
half. During that time, the Jordanian textile industry has exploded, but other exports remain
elusive. For the Agreement to be considered a long-term success, the country must begin
attracting investment in other export sectors, preferably those which produce goods with a
requirement for higher skilled labor, supporting jobs with higher wages that would encourage
greater Jordanian participation in the country’s export sector. If this can be done, then it is likely
that the Agreement will have fulfilled its economic objectives; if it cannot, then it is likely that
even with favored tariff status, the Agreement’s long-term success will be limited.
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Conclusion: The Successes and Failures of
the USJFTA and the Switch Away from Free
Trade
This thesis has examined the United States Jordan Free Trade Agreement, and viewed it as both
an instrument of foreign policy and as an instrument of trade policy. When it was created, the
hope was that the trade generated by the Agreement would have a profound effect on Jordan’s
economy, raising living standards, supporting Jordan’s stability and enhancing democracy in
Jordan. In this way, the USJFTA was meant to be part of a “peace dividend,” while also serving as
an example to other states in the region and around the world. The first chapter evaluated the
USJFTA as an instrument of foreign policy, while the second chapter placed it in the context of
shifts in American trade policy. The third chapter evaluated the economic impact of the USJFTA
and the human effects of the economic changes that occurred as a result of the Agreement, with
a particular focus on the labor effects. Along these dimensions, if the Agreement had to be
summarized in two words, it could best be called a “qualified success.” It should be noted that
the USJFTA also includes provisions on intellectual property rights and electronic commerce,
which have effects in Jordan but which this thesis has not evaluated.

Evaluating the Successes and Failures of the USJFTA
The Agreement has its origins in the Jordan-Israeli peace treaty signed in 1994, which made that
country the second Arab nation to sign a peace treaty and normalize relations with Israel. Israel
has long been considered a key US partner and ally in the Middle East, and ensuring Israel’s
security has been one of the core goals of American policy in the Middle East. During the Cold
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War, the United States considered Jordan to be a partner in resisting Soviet influence in the Arab
world, but the country’s conflict with its eastern neighbor, Israel, held back Jordanian-American
relations. Over time, Jordan and Israel came to recognize shared interests. Specifically, they
both came to believe that the PLO represented a potential threat to their countries and
governments. This was particularly true for Jordan, as more than half of Jordan’s population was
of Palestinian origin. Covert negotiations in the 1980s led to Jordan’s abandonment of claims on
the West Bank in 1989, and to a formal peace treaty between the two countries in 1994.
The United States provided incentives to encourage Jordanian recognition of Israel and a formal
peace treaty, including a promise to cancel $700m of Jordanian debt, and following the treaty
the Clinton Administration sought create a more sizeable “peace dividend” for Jordan. The goals
of this dividend were threefold: First, to provide a visible example to other Arab nations of the
expected benefits of normalizing relations with Israel, second, to provide real benefits to the
Jordanian people and nation to smooth over negative any sentiments about the treaty, and
finally, to support the stability of the Jordanian nation and government, a country the US now
firmly considered an ally. To accomplish the first goal, the United States recognized Jordan as a
Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA), putting it in elite company that included Australia, Japan, South
Korea and Israel. To accomplish the second goal, the Clinton Administration asked Congress to
amend the US-Israel Free Trade Agreement to create special “Qualified Industrial Zones” (QIZ) in
Jordan. Goods manufactured in these zones, which had to include Israeli content could pass to
the United States tariff-free, as if they were entering from Israel. This encouraged direct
economic cooperation between Israel and Jordan, but was limited in geography and scope. To
expand the economic benefits throughout Jordan, the Clinton Administration began negotiations
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for a Free Trade Agreement with Jordan. Like MNNA status, the FTA offered Jordan prestige,
putting it in a small group of nations. The Administration also believed that it would help the
Jordanian economy grow significantly.
Free Trade Agreements fit in well with the Clinton Administration’s foreign policy doctrine of
Enlargement, which was heavily influenced by the Liberal paradigm of International Relations
theory. As the first President elected after the end of the Cold War, the Administration felt it
had to articulate a new overarching strategy for American foreign policy to replace
“Containment” (of the Soviet Union). Enlargement sought to build institutions that would
support peace and development, and did this by strengthening, fostering and otherwise
promoting market economies and democratic development. Enlargement drew upon liberal
thought that goes as far back as Deutsch (1973) and Haus (1958) which assumed that the
relationship between trade and peace was mutually reinforcing. In essence, Enlargement is a
merging of trade and foreign policies, and assumes that democracy (or at least pro-Western
attitudes) and peace will flow from increased trade. This echoes Liberal thinkers such as
Ikenberry and others who note the importance of the development of institutions outside of
government to foster international stability.
A key premise of the USJFTA was that higher living standards, and stronger ties to Israel, would
help to stabilize the region. By making peace “pay,” there would popular support within Jordan
for normalized relations with Israel, and an incentive for others to follow suit. Enlargement was
also based on the belief that neoliberal economic policies will increase living standards and help
to foster a middle class, a strong civil society and, ultimately, democratic institutions. The middle
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class, being rich enough to have something to lose, and yet not rich enough to stash money in a
foreign bank in case of domestic turmoil, has something to gain from a better-run country, and
something to lose if it is not. An empowered middle class would demand a greater say in their
country’s government – leading to eventual democratization. As such, the USJFTA was a bet that
the “trade first” approach of Enlargement could work to create a middle class and support
democratization.
The question remains, then, whether or not these various goals were achieved. The answer, as
demonstrated in the previous pages, is that the USJFTA was partially successful at achieving the
goals of Enlargement, though fell short in key ways. Hence, the experience of the USJFTA
provides some evidence for a Liberal argument: Jordan and Israel have remained at peace, and
their relationship has shown that it can bend but not break, withstanding tension and resolution.
There is also an increasing element of democratic accountability within Jordan. During the Arab
Spring, Jordan’s government was one of only two that had the confidence to enact real
constitutional reform in response to protests. Protestors took to the streets, the government
did not clamp down violently, and in the end, the protests only claimed one civilian and two
police lives. The regime stayed in place, the country enacted constitutional reforms that brought
Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood into the political fold, and Freedom House
moved Jordan from its list of “not free” countries to “partly free” as a result of those changes.
In regard to the larger economic goals, however, the USJFTA may have supported Jordan’s
economy to some extent, but has not led to the development of a middle class (and increased
living standards) that was originally envisioned. The USJFTA did have a significant effect on
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Jordan’s economy. Jordan’s total exports expanded drastically under the QIZ program and the
USJFTA. The total value of Jordan’s exports increased from $1.5 billion USD in 1997 to just under
$9.5 billion in 2015, with $1.9 billion that total sent to the United States. The US has gone from
being the destination for less than 2% of Jordan’s exports to more than 20%. The country has
generally had a significant trade surplus with the United States, giving the country an important
source of hard currency. Although the FTA is not the only (or even perhaps the primary) reason
for Jordan’s stability, it can be said to be a contributing factor. Jordan has managed to maintain
its per capita GDP even as the country’s population has doubled over the past 20 years. In the
past three years alone, the country’s population has swelled by over 1.7 million people, or more
than 20%, as refugees have entered the country fleeing the civil war in Syria and the
advancement of ISIS in Iraq. Foreign policy does not occur in a vacuum, and it seems likely that
the USJFTA was a contributor towards Jordan’s continued stability in a region that has been
wrought with turmoil for a decade and a half.
Jordanian trade with the US is almost entirely in textiles and garments. It is here that
Dependency theorists find evidence to support their views. Over 90% of Jordanian exports to
the US since the FTA was ratified have been from the garment industry. Under the Agreement,
total Jordanian garment exports have exploded, from just $42 million in 1997 to $1.9 billion in
2015. Over 89% of Jordan’s textile and apparel exports are to the United States. This suggests
that Jordan has no real advantage as a textile producer, or Jordan’s export markets would be
more varied; rather, Jordan’s “advantage” in the industry comes from its tariff-free status. This
has significant implications for the growth and development of the Jordanian economy. It means
that Jordan’s industry is highly dependent upon cost. American tariffs on Jordanian textiles prior
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to the Agreement were roughly 10%. This 10% margin is the effective ceiling on how much it can
raise prices before its apparel industry is no longer competitive with other countries after
allowing for global changes in prices; limiting the ability of Jordanian producers to increase
wages, improve working conditions, or otherwise support development.
An unforeseen result of this industry’s development – and therefore, the USJFTA – was the
importation of a large labor force, almost entirely women from South Asia, to work in the
Jordanian textile industry. Roughly 75% of the jobs in the industry are held by workers from
South Asia, and the industry has had a very difficult time recruiting Jordanians – total
applications by Jordanian workers were less than a quarter of the total number of job openings
in the industry over a two year period. With producers facing a price ceiling if they wish to
remain competitive, producers are limited in what they can do to entice more Jordanians to
apply; Jordanian workers already command a price premium over imported labor from South
Asia, many of whom have prior experience in the textile industry.
A decade ago, there were widespread reports of physical and sexual abuse of workers alongside
long hours and dire working conditions in the industry. The “enforceable” labor provisions gave
little solace to garment workers in Jordan: Violations can only be addressed if they’re found to
affect trade between the parties – a fairly high standard of evidence. The USJFTA’s labor
provision was used only to the extent of generating reports on conditions in the factories by
Jordan’s Ministry of Labor, starting in 2006. This reinforces critics who argued that the
enforceable labor provisions would probably not be used, and if they were, real appreciable
change from the perspective of workers would only happen slowly, if ever. Although more
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recent reports show that conditions have improved, with higher wages, better adherence to
rules for overtime pay and regulations for working conditions, and significantly fewer reports of
abuses, many of these improvements happened only after the 2012 and 2013 factory fire and
building collapse in Bangladesh raised awareness of working conditions in the textile industry
globally. In any event, these trends undercut many of the predictions offered by Neo-Liberal
theorists about the effects of free trade on countries such as Jordan.
Additionally, although the Agreement has seemingly been an impetus to increased FDI into
Jordan, increases in foreign investment are highly correlated with increases in textile production
soon afterwards. This suggests that the investment is not ultimately causing Jordan to move up
the scale of production, opening new industries that offer the chance of higher wages for higherskilled workers, which is in line with the predictions of Dependency theory and later Marxist
critiques. Given the low wages of the textile industry, and the fact that Jordanians compromise
less than a quarter of the industry’s workforce, it has not been a significant driver of Jordanian
job growth, let alone middle class job growth, meaning that the USJFTA has not succeeded at
achieving one of its core goals. Jordan’s per capita GDP did rise gradually in the years after
implementation, but it was rising before the Agreement was negotiated, and has plateaued
since, suggesting that the USJFTA has done little to improve the quality of life for Jordanians.
Real per capita GDP in Jordan today is only $500 higher than it was in the 30 years ago.
On the whole, then, the USJFTA has achieved some, but not all, of its intended aims, and both
Liberals, Dependency theorists and Realists can find evidence that fits their theories. Liberals
can state that the USJFTA has been one of the factors in solidifying Jordan’s relationship with
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Israel (and with the United States), even if it has not led other Arab nations to follow Jordan’s
example. The Agreement did support Jordan’s economy, making the United States a significant
trading partner for the country. Jordan has remained stable, and was able to navigate the Arab
Spring with almost no bloodshed and enacted constitutional reforms that marked a small step
towards democratization. The USJFTA would not seem to be the causal link, however, it may
have played a supporting role. Dependency, critical and Marxist theorists can point to the
Jordanian textile industry for evidence of their critique of neo-liberal economic policies. Jordan
has not used the USJFTA as a springboard for the development of middle class jobs, and seems
“stuck” exporting low-cost textiles made by foreign workers. This foreign workforce has been
subjected to workplace and physical abuse, and the USJFTA’s enforceable labor provisions did
little to stop, or even slow, the abuse.
Realists can point to the relatively short time horizon of the Agreement and say that there has
not been enough time to determine wither the USJFTA has ultimately fostered a long and lasting
peace between Jordan and Israel. They could also use the same evidence that Dependency
theorists use to argue that the USJFTA has essentially “locked” Jordan in an ideal place for Israel:
The USJFTA does enough to support Jordanian stability and prevent spillover violence from a
potentially dangerous neighbor, but not enough to increase Jordan’s relative strength to the
extent that would pose a threat. Perhaps more to the point, realists of all stripes would argue
that the most critical factor concerning the Israel-Jordanian relationship – and the AmericanJordanian relationship – was the perception of shared interest in closer ties. Economic
considerations, from this view, would be secondary.
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While evaluating the USJFTA in light of regional and global events and economics of the past
twenty years, the preponderance of evidence supports the Liberal institutionalist perspective,
with qualifications, though with significant evidence against claims made by neoliberal
economics. Jordan’s stability during and after the Arab Spring and Syrian civil war, while its
population has exploded, is due in part to its economic and political ties to the US and Israel.
The more ambitious hopes of Enlargement have not come to pass; however, Jordan has
managed to maintain (and slightly improve) its standard of living despite the population boom.
Jordan has successfully developed an export industry with the United States, even though the US
has FTAs with other nations at Jordan’s approximate level of development. If Jordan’s middle
class hasn’t boomed, neither have the ranks of its impoverished. There is evidence that Jordan
may be “moving up the production chain” with automotive exports to Europe, but it has not
been able to outcompete competitors with closer geographical proximity like Mexico, or more
capital, such as South Korea, both of which have FTAs with the United States, in the American
market. If a Realist views the USJFTA as an attempt to maintain Jordan in a position of limited
economic opportunity, and therefore, power, to Israel (an argument which takes for granted the
longer-term nature of the US-Israel alliance), then it seems a particularly short-sighted policy aim
at a time when violent protests, revolutions and civil war have enveloped several of Israel’s
neighbors. The USJFTA did not succeed at all of the aims of Enlargement, but is in part because
its form was limited by domestic American political considerations.

Free Trade Agreements and American Politics
The USJFTA is also significant insofar as it marked the beginning of a significant increase in the
use of bilateral free trade agreements by the United States: Two were signed in the 1980s, one
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was signed and one negotiated in the 1990s. During the 8 years of George W. Bush’s
administration, eight FTAs were signed, including DR-CAFTA, an agreement with six other
countries. The Obama Administration shepherded three additional FTAs, largely negotiated in
the Bush Administration, to ratification, and negotiated the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP),
which would be by far the largest FTA the United States has negotiated.
The FTAs with Israel and Canada were largely uncontroversial, but the inclusion of Mexico, a
country with much lower labor costs and environmental standards in NAFTA caused controversy.
NAFTA had largely been written but was not yet finalized during the 1992 Presidential election,
and became a topic of the campaign. Supporters argued that the agreement would be good for
American consumers and producers, and help support the economic development of Mexico.
Detractors argued that NAFTA would cost American jobs as US workers would have to compete
with lower-cost Mexican labor, and would create a “giant sucking sound” as Ross Perot
memorably put it, as American factory work moved “South of the border, pay a dollar an hour
for labor… no environmental controls, no pollution controls and no retirement” (Bush, Clinton
and Perot 1992).
Clinton, breaking new ground for Democratic presidential candidates, ultimately supported
NAFTA’s passage, on the condition that the US negotiate labor and environmental agreements
alongside NAFTA to protect workers and the environment, thereby addressing the criticism
articulated by Perot and others. Although no labor groups ultimately supported NAFTA’s
passage, Clinton’s insistence on adding labor protections in a side agreement reduced the
union’s ability to mount an effective campaign against the agreement. Labor and environmental
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protections were added to the main body of the USJFTA, and have since become a standard part
of American-negotiated FTAs, including those negotiated during George W Bush’s presidency.
Free Trade Agreements appealed to the Enlargement doctrine the Clinton Administration
articulated following the election, particularly after the Administration shepherded the passage
of NAFTA with labor and environmental side agreements. Business and international groups
would support FTAs, as would some environmental organizations, and labor unions had not been
able to effectively organize against them if they included labor and environmental provisions.
Additionally, FTAs have essentially no direct fiscal cost at a time when the Republican-controlled
Congress was wary of anything that might increase the deficit, and they enjoyed bipartisan
support in Congress. In short, bilateral FTAs had ideological appeal under the Enlargement
doctrine, and practical appeal from a political standpoint.
The inclusion of labor and environmental protections in the body of the USJFTA was Clinton’s
attempt to prevent the “great sucking sound” of American jobs leaving the country that Ross
Perot predicted would result from NAFTA, and became the key issue as the USJFTA was
negotiated in Congress. This hints at an important policy constraint the Administration faced as
it crafted the Agreement. Despite the limitations and ultimate ineffectiveness of the labor
provisions documented in earlier sections, they still proved controversial enough that the Bush
Administration did little to support the USJFTA’s ratification until after 9/11, and those invited to
testify by Republican senators on the Agreement were openly opposed to the inclusion of these
provisions. Even if the Jordanians could be persuaded to sign an agreement with stronger labor
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and environmental protections, the debate in Congress raises doubts as to whether an
agreement with stronger language would have been ratified.
The greatest successes of the Clinton Administration’s Enlargement doctrine are the creation of
the WTO, China’s ascension to it, and the USJFTA. Of these, the USJFTA uniquely expands past
trade policy to directly address the broader foreign policy and democratization objectives of
Enlargement, of which the labor and environmental provisions were a key part. Strategically, the
inclusion these provisions had two related goals for the Clinton Administration. The first was to
provide a model for future FTAs, a “gold standard” that included labor and environmental
provisions. The second was to broaden the domestic coalition in favor of FTAs and provide and
reduce the number of those critical of the Agreements, both in Congress, in civic groups, and at
the ballot box.
On the first measure, the Administration was successful, as subsequent FTAs included similar
enforceable language. On the second, success was partial and, it turns out, temporary. In the
2016 presidential election campaign, both major party candidates opposed the trade pact, as did
Democratic candidate Bernie Sanders, who continued to influence the Democratic ticket even
after he had lost his party’s nomination. Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders were consistently
opposed to trade in general – citing the social dislocation associated with neo-liberal economic
policies – and to the Transpacific Partnership (TPP) in particular. The TPP was then under
negotiation by the Obama Administration, and was very much rooted in the Liberal paradigm of
the Clinton enlargement policy, though also had a realist motivation. The TPP was intended, in
part, to contain China’s dominance by binding the neighboring Asian countries to the US (Green
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and Goodman, 2015). During the 2016 election cycle, however, Hillary Clinton voiced
opposition to the TPP as early as October 2015 (PBS Newshour, 2015), and sought to distance
herself from the pact she helped negotiate (and publicly supported) while Secretary of State.
Although the candidates offered different criticisms of specific parts of the TPP, the central
criticism from all candidates was the potential negative impact on American workers
(Ballotopedia, 2016). Sanders, in particular, also identified environmental concerns and worker
welfare in other TPP nations as concerns (ibid). Trump tied his opposition to the TPP to his
conservative populism, and used NAFTA as evidence that US workers were negatively affected by
FTAs like the TPP (ibid).
The Trump Administration’s withdrawal from the negotiations make it unlikely that the United
States will ever ratify the TPP, and reduces the credibility of the United States in future trade
negotiations. Popular opposition to FTAs comes despite agreement from economists that US
citizens benefited from NAFTA (IGM Chicago, 2012), and formal economic analysis that US
welfare increased slightly as a result of the deal (Caliendo and Parro, 2015). Free trade –
abstractly – continues to be relatively popular amongst American voters. A majority of Americans
supported free trade in a poll done in April 17, and even in October 2016, in the heat of the
election, 45% of Americans voiced support (Jones 2017). Yet those opposed to free trade are
more strongly opposed than those in favor, and more Americans believe that their personal
finances have been hurt by free trade than those that believe they have been helped by it.
The opposition to the TPP should not be seen as a judgment of the agreement as a specific
document. Although the candidates identified specific issues they had with the pact, the TPP
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resonated as an issue with voters because it was a symbol of the broader project of neoliberal
globalization and its effects on workers. It was a specific, identifiable target that could be
successfully opposed, unlike the WTO or previous trade deals. This, when combined with the
weak labor provisions in the USJFTA and later trade deals, explains why opposing the TPP
resonated with voters. Although USJFTA’s effects in the Jordanian textile industry were not
discussed in the campaign, the experience there looks almost exactly like the specter described
by Perot in 1992 and feared by many American workers ever since. Workers were brought in
from another country, asked to work for pennies an hour and up to 20 hours a day. Many
workers were denied overtime pay to which they were entitled, and some may have been paid
less than the minimum wage, while some were subjected to physical and sexual abuse. The US
government had few means of stopping or preventing these abuses, and it took years and
international pressure before the Jordanian government was able to improve conditions. Instead
of providing an example of how free trade deals could be beneficial without asking Americans to
compete on an unfair playing field, the USJFTA instead showed how limited the protections
afforded to workers actually are. That these effects were unpredicted would only add to the
suspicion towards these deals.
Previous pages have argued that as a discrete matter of policy, the USJFTA has been relatively
successful in achieving its aims, from achieving foreign policy goals in cementing Jordan’s peace
and providing a source of hard currency and stability to Jordan, to providing a model for future
trade deals. If viewed as more than an individual policy, and instead, as a test case for Clinton’s
assumption that socially progressive and Liberal goals could be achieved through neoliberal
economic means, however, the Agreement looks starkly less successful. The doctrine of
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Enlargement, which found a natural manifestation in free trade agreements, was motivated by
practicality as much as ideology. At a time when neoliberal economic ideals were ascendant,
the Clinton Administration bet that they could be used to achieve broader social and institutional
reforms. The experience of the Jordanian garment industry shows how limited the Clinton
Administration was in creating labor provisions that actually protected laborers, and the more
recent backlash against the TPP shows that the protections in the USJFTA and subsequent
agreements have not shifted the arguments against trade deals. This casts doubt on whether
the neoliberal project of trade liberalization can be successfully tamed to protect human rights
and used to achieve social and political liberalization.
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